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Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges 
Michael J. Burstein* 
ABSTRACT 
Patents have become a serious business risk. They issue from the Patent 
and Trademark Office in record-breaking quantity and are aggressively en-
forced by patent trolls. But many patents are likely to be invalid; and even 
those which are valid are likely to be narrower than their owners claim. Firms 
investing in innovation would find it desirable to clear their respective fields of 
invalid or overbroad patents prior to making their investments, and there is. 
great social value in reducing the number of such patents. But the path to 
determining the validity or scope of issued patents runs through the courts, 
and in recent years the Federal Circuit has developed special standing rules for 
patent challengers that allow access to the courts only when it appears that an 
infringement suit is temporally or legally proximate. In this Article, I criticize 
this "proximity" criterion on conceptual, doctrinal, and normative grounds 
and provide a comprehensive account of standing to challenge the scope and 
validity of patents. Conceptually, I argue that because patents are a form of 
regulation, their effects sweep more broadly than the Federal Circuit currently 
appreciates. When the risk of infringement liability deters business and invest-
ment activities, the affected parties can bring a "quiet title" action to obtain 
certainty about the validity or scope of adverse patents. I then argue as a 
doctrinal matter that there is no reason to treat patent challenges differently 
from other cases. Applying traditional principles of constitutional and pru-
dential standing broadens the range of potential plaintiffs. Finally, I justify 
this result on normative grounds because the Federal Circuit's restrictive ap-
proach creates a misalignment between those who have incentives to challenge 
patents and those who have access to the courts. Allowing challenges by a 
broader range of plaintiffs will result in more socially valuable validity 
litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patents have become a serious business risk. They are produced 
in greater quantities than ever before.1 A whole industry based upon 
threats of patent enforcement-the infamous patent trolls-has 
sprung up, leading to a surge in intellectual property litigation.2 And 
a judgment of infringement can have devastating effects for a busi-
ness, subjecting it to crippling damages and an injunction against con-
tinuing any infringing operations.3 A great many of the patents that 
are issued and litigated are invalid; and even more are of uncertain 
1 In fiscal year 2013, the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") issued over 
265,000 utility patents. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND Ac. 
COUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 192 tbl.6. Even just ten years ago, in 2003, the 
PTO issued just over 171,000. See id. 
2 The literature on patent trolls is large and growing. For an overview, see Colleen V. 
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Miss-
ing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 CoLuM. L. REv. 2117 (2013); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths , 
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). 
3 See 35 U .S.C. § 284 (2012) (authorizing up to treble damages in certain cases of patent 
infringement); id. § 283 (authorizing injunctive relief for patent infringement). 
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scope, particularly in the software industry. But it is very difficult to 
predict the validity or scope of an issued patent prior to litigation.4 So 
what is a business facing this risk to do in planning its activities? Inno-
vation, after all, takes time and money; investments in innovation 
often must be made well before new products or processes actually 
see the light of day. An innovative company often may face an impos-
sible choice. It must either make fixed investments despite the risk 
that those investments can be held up later through patent litigation, 
or it must steer clear of any possibly infringing activity no matter how 
weak an adverse patent claim may be. 
If this hypothetical business were a real estate developer uncer-
tain about whether it was authorized to build on a parcel of land, 
there would be an obvious third choice: it could resolve the uncer-
tainty through a quiet title action.5 But in recent years the Federal 
Circuit has developed a set of standing rules that prevents most devel-
opers of intellectual property, rather than real property, from bringing 
such an action. Instead of making the familiar inquiry into standing-
whether a plaintiff has been injured in fact, by the defendant, in a 
manner redressable by a favorable judicial ruling6-the Federal Cir-
cuit inquires into the temporal and legal proximity of an infringement 
suit.7 A plaintiff can "quiet title" as to the validity or scope of a pat-
ent only if she is likely to be sued for infringement-that is, if she has 
come close to infringing and the defendant has signaled a willingness 
to assert the patent. 
This Article critiques these standing rules on conceptual, doctri-
nal, and normative grounds. It argues that the Federal Circuit has 
misconceived the injury that arises from even the mere existence of a 
patent, has crafted patent-specific standing rules that are more restric-
tive than those called for under the Supreme Court's broader standing 
precedents, and has created a misalignment between those who have 
the incentive to challenge patents and those who have standing to do 
so. The result is fewer and lower quality challenges8 than may be 
optimal. 
4 Issued patents enjoy a presumption of validity, but courts retain authority finally to 
adjudicate that issue. See id. § 282(a) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); Microsoft Corp. v. 
i4i Ltd. P'Ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (requiring proof of invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
5 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2012). 
6 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 I use the term "patent challenges" throughout this Article to refer to both declaratory 
judgment suits and administrative proceedings, and to refer to both invalidity and noninfringe-
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Standing to sue has not until recently been a significant issue in 
patent litigation. In the typical case, a patent holder files suit against 
an accused infringer. The infringement defendant, in turn, can assert 
as a defense that the patent is invalid and can seek, by way of counter-
claim, a declaratory judgment voiding the patent.9 In this posture, 
there is no question that the infringement defendant has standing to 
challenge the validity of the patent that is being asserted against her. 
Her counterclaim is part and parcel of the same "[c)ase[ ]" or 
"[c]ontrovers[y]" that arose when she was sued for infringement.1° 
As patents and patent litigation have proliferated, however, 
proactive actions seeking to invalidate or narrow patents have become 
more common. Indeed, Congress acknowledged the importance of 
more and better mechanisms for weeding out invalid intellectual prop-
erty when it enacted new patent review procedures as part of the 
America Invents Act ("AIA").11 Challenges to a patent's scope or 
validity may take two forms, but both require access to the courts. 
The first is a declaratory judgment action filed in the district court. 
Although in the past these actions were usually brought only by licen-
sees or infringement defendants seeking a favorable forum, groups 
such as the ACLU, the Public Patent Foundation, and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation are adopting a public interest model of patent 
litigation reminiscent of that found in civil rights or environmental 
law.12 The most prominent example of this litigation model is the 
challenge to the validity of breast cancer gene patents in Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 13 
The second type of validity challenge is an appeal from adminis-
trative post-grant review proceedings. Through the new AIA proce-
dures, any "person who is not the owner of a patent" may file a 
petition with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") "to cancel 
ment grounds. For the most part, the standing concerns are the same as between challenges to a 
patent's validity and to its scope. See infra Part III.C. 
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)-(3) (2012). A judicial finding that a patent is invalid has 
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 
402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971). 
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
11 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299-313 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Joe Mata!, A Guide to the Legis-
lative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 600--05 (2012) 
( collecting legislative history of post-grant review provisions). 
12 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 41, 41-45 
(2012) (analogizing such actions to the public law litigation model described in Abram Chayes, 
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976)). 
13 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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as unpatentable [one] or more claims of a patent."14 But those agency 
proceedings are not final. Any party, including the challenger, may 
appeal the agency's determination in federal court.15 And the Federal 
Circuit recently concluded that its standing rules apply both to declar-
atory judgments and to agency appeals.16 
As judicial and administrative validity challenges become impor-
tant mechanisms to weed out invalid intellectual property and to 
check the behavior of patent trolls, standing is being litigated with in-
creasing frequency. 17 Indeed, aspects of intellectual property standing 
appeared on the Supreme Court's docket twice in the 2012 Term-in 
Myriad, the gene patents case, and in Already, LLC v. Nike Inc., 18 a 
trademark case. Neither case definitively resolved the issue.19 Stand-
ing questions therefore continue to vex courts and litigants in patent 
challenges. 
This Article offers the first comprehensive treatment of standing 
to challenge the validity or scope of patents. It makes three contribu-
tions. First, I develop a conceptual account of the injury that may 
arise from the existence of intellectual property.20 Intellectual prop-
erty rights are rights in rem. They purport to exclude the world from 
the subject matter they cover. As such, they regulate the primary be-
14 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a)-(b), 321(a)-(b) (2012). 
15 See id. §§ 319, 329. 
16 See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261--62 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (requiring underlying injury in fact separate and distinct from loss before the agency 
for standing), cert. denied, 2015 WL 731871 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015). 
17 In 2012 and 2013, the Federal Circuit issued eight decisions on declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction in patent cases. See Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Alta. Telecomms. Research Ctr., 538 F. App'x 
894 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013); Arkema Inc. v. Honeywell Int'), Inc., 706 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Fox Grp., Inc. v. 
Cree, Inc., 700 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Matthews Int'! Corp. v. Biosafe Eng'g, LLC, 695 F.3d 
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Dey Pharma, LP v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc. , 677 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
3M Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 673 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Streck, Inc. v. Research & 
Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
1s Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013). 
19 In Already, the Court considered an issue common to patent and trademark litigation: 
whether a covenant not to sue for past or present infringing activity mooted a declaratory judg-
ment action when the plaintiff alleged a continued risk of future injury. See id. at 725. The 
Court, however, construed the relevant covenant to include future activity, avoiding the question 
whether a risk of infringement liability was sufficient for standing. See id. at 728-29. Although 
the standing issue was contested in Myriad, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's finding that 
at least one plaintiff had standing in a brief footnote with little reasoning. See Ass'n for Molecu-
lar Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 (2013). 
20 See infra Part II. Megan La Belle analogizes patent litigation to traditional public law 
litigation. See La Belle, supra note 12. Although La Belle argues for expanded standing on that 
ground, see id. at 92-93, she does not engage the question how intellectual property results in 
Article III injury. 
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havior of those in the relevant field. When patents are of uncertain 
validity or scope, their mere presence creates risk and uncertainty that 
deters productive investments. This risk itself is an injury. It prevents 
people from engaging in conduct that, if the intellectual property were 
invalid, they otherwise would be entitled to undertake. 
Second, I situate the problem of intellectual property standing 
within the broader doctrinal context of the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional and prudential standing jurisprudence.21 I argue that there is 
nothing about intellectual property that justifies the development of 
special rules that depart from the Supreme Court's general principles. 
The Court recognizes in a variety of contexts that the risk or uncer-
tainty of regulation can give rise to standing so long as a judicial deter-
mination reduces or eliminates the risk or uncertainty. Patent 
challenges fit easily into these precedents and their underlying norma-
tive commitments. Patent challenges also are justified on well-estab-
lished prudential grounds. 
Finally, I make the normative argument not only that broader 
standing will produce more validity challenges, but also that a return 
to classic standing principles will remedy a misalignment between 
those who can bring intellectual property validity challenges and those 
who have the incentive to do so.22 Direct competitors, the preferred 
plaintiffs under current rules, often have an individual incentive to ex-
pend time and money on validity litigation that does not align with 
that of other competitors or society as a whole. They bring fewer va-
lidity challenges on narrower grounds than might other plaintiffs such 
as indirect or potential competitors. Allowing challenges from both 
21 See infra Part III. Several scholars have suggested fixes to the discretionary factors 
applied in declaratory judgment cases. See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evaluating Declaratory 
Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 987-89 (2008); Lisa A. 
Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent Litigants' Access to 
the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 407, 432-34 (2007). To my knowledge, this 
Article is the first to address the constitutional and prudential status of patent challenges, and 
the first to do so across the full range of procedural postures. 
22 See infra Part IV. Others have articulated a variety of reasons why expanded standing 
might be good policy, but have not expressly linked standing to the incentive to bring validity 
challenges. See La Belle, supra note 12, at 92-93 (arguing for rules that encourage challenges 
based on public policy concerns); Nicholas D. Walrath, Note, Expanding Standing in Patent De-
claratory Judgment Actions to Better Air Public Policy Considerations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 476, 
480-81 (2013) (same); see also Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents & Bargaining Breakdown: 
When Is Declaratory Relief Needed?, 64 S.M.U. L. REv. 895, 897-98 (2011) (arguing that declar-
atory relief should be more readily available for vague patent claims); Kali N. Murray, Rules for 
Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 77-81 (2006) (arguing for broad 
standing to allow multiple stakeholders to shape patent policy). 
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actual and potential competitors to proceed in court would therefore 
enhance the social value of patent litigation. 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S "PROXIMITY" STANDARD 
Most of the law concerning the justiciability of patent challenges 
has been developed in the context of declaratory judgment actions. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[i]n a case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United 
States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any inter-
ested party seeking such declaration. "23 The Supreme Court has long 
held that the "case of actual controversy" language in the statute in-
corporates Article Ill's strictures on federal jurisdiction.24 So actions 
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act are subject to the same 
justiciability analysis as any other actions.25 They still must satisfy the 
requirements of standing, mootness, and ripeness. 
One of the original uses of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to 
seek a declaration that intellectual property was invalid.26 That partic-
ular use remains common. Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit articu-
lated and consistently applied a two-part test for determining whether 
a court had jurisdiction to hear a claim under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act that a patent was invalid.27 For jurisdiction to be proper, the 
court required "both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the pat-
entee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the de-
claratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present 
activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken 
with the intent to conduct such activity."28 The court was rarely clear 
about the rationale for this test. Its reasoning seemed to be simply 
that an "actual controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment Act was 
necessary for the exercise of Article III jurisdiction, and the two-part 
23 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
24 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937). 
25 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 17 
(1983) (" (T]he Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to affect only the remedies available in a 
federal district court, not the court's jurisdiction .... "). 
26 See EDWIN Bo RCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 803-04 (2d ed. 1941). 
27 See, e.g., Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp. , Inc. , 441 F.3d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U .S. 
118 (2007); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Gen-
Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. , 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase 
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1995); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 
F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 
736 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
2s BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978. 
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test could be used to determine whether such an "actual controversy" 
existed.29 The court explained that there was no controversy unless 
the defendant expressed an "intent to enforce its patent" and the 
plaintiff had "a true interest to be protected by the declaratory judg-
ment."30 In the court's view, it seems, there was only an "actual con-
troversy" when there was "an underlying legal cause of action that the 
declaratory defendant could have brought or threatened to bring, if 
not for the fact that the declaratory plaintiff ha[d] preempted it."31 
Only, therefore, when a declaratory plaintiff could have been the de-
fendant in an infringement suit was she allowed first to file a declara-
tory judgment action. 
The Federal Circuit viewed its test as a constitutional require-
ment for jurisdiction.32 It therefore applied that test across a wide 
range of fact patterns and procedural postures. The most straightfor-
ward were instances where the declaratory judgment was sought as a 
counterclaim in an infringement suit. In that circumstance, the "rea-
sonable apprehension" of suit had already matured into an actual suit, 
and so the test was satisfied.33 But the court also held that even after a 
suit was filed, the patent holder could unilaterally divest the court of 
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment counterclaim by moving to 
dismiss the original infringement action and making a covenant not to 
sue again over the defendant's then-existing products or conduct.34 
The court held that licensees were never in reasonable apprehension 
of suit so long as they continued to make royalty payments and did 
not breach their licenses; the license agreement "obliterate[s] any rea-
29 See, e.g. , Teva Pharm., 395 F.3d at 1331-32 ("The [Declaratory Judgment] Act, which 
parallels Article III of the Constitution, requires an actual controversy between the parties 
before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction . ... This court has developed a two-part inquiry 
to determine whether there is an actual controversy in a suit requesting a declaration of patent 
non-infringement or invalidity.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Gen-Probe, 
359 F.3d at 1379-80; Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735-36. 
30 Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736. 
31 Microchip Tech., 441 F.3d at 943. 
32 See, e.g., Medimmune, 427 F.3d at 964-65; Teva Pharm., 395 F.3d at 1335; Dolak, supra 
note 21 , at 423-24. · 
33 See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 ("If defendant has expressly charged a current activity 
of the plaintiff as an infringement, there is clearly an actual controversy, certainty has rendered 
apprehension irrelevant, and one need say no more."). 
· 34 See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Inter-
national, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993), the Federal Circuit consistently held that affirmance of a judg-
ment of noninfringement justified vacating a declaratory judgment of invalidity because "the 
finding of noninfrginement has entirely resolved the controversy between the litigants by resolv-
ing the initial complaint brought by the patentee." Id. at 91-92. The Supreme Court rejected 
this practice and its rationale. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. 
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sonable apprehension" that the licensee will be sued for infringe-
ment.35 As to parties without a preexisting relationship, the court 
developed a fact-specific jurisprudence about what constitutes suffi-
cient threats of litigation to place a declaratory judgment plaintiff in 
"reasonable apprehension of suit. "36 
The Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable apprehension of 
suit" test in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 37 In that case, the 
plaintiff Medlmmune was a licensee of the defendant Genentech.38 
When a dispute over whether a patent was covered by the license 
arose, Medlmmune continued to pay the demanded royalties-it was 
unwilling to risk the possibility of treble damages and an injunction 
against selling a product that accounted for more than 80 percent of 
its revenue in an infringement action39-but also brought a declara-
tory judgment to invalidate Genentech's patent.40 The Federal Circuit 
held that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the action because, so 
long as Medlmmune paid royalties under the license, Medlmmune 
had no reasonable apprehension of suit.41 The Supreme Court re-
versed. The Court acknowledged that Medlmmune's "own acts ... 
eliminate the imminent threat of harm" because "[a]s long as .. . pay-
ments are made, there is no risk that [Genentech] will seek to enjoin 
[Medlmmune's) sales."42 But the Court expressly rejected the "rea-
sonable apprehension of suit" test.43 Instead, the Court reiterated that 
"the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between 
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and re-
ality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."44 Because 
Medlmmune sought a declaration of actively contested rights, its own 
reluctance to expose itself to liability was no barrier to bringing a de-
claratory judgment action. As the Court wrote: "The rule that a plain-
tiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble 
damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a 
35 Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
36 See, e.g., BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978-80 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
37 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
38 See id. at 121. 
39 Id. at 122. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 128. 
43 See id. at 132 n.11. 
44 Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in 
Article III. "45 
In the years since the Med/mmune decision, the Federal Circuit 
has not been consistent either in its articulation of the legal standards 
for justiciability in patent validity actions or in its application of those 
standards across different factual circumstances. But a pattern has 
emerged in which, once again, the likelihood of standing depends 
upon how close the parties are to engaging in infringement litigation. 
One strand of the caselaw has adopted a weaker version of the 
pre-Med/mmune two-part test. In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectron-
ics, Inc.,46 the first patent standing case the Federal Circuit decided 
after Medlmmune , the court acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme 
Court's opinion in Medlmmune represents a rejection of [the] reason-
able apprehension of suit test."47 But it nevertheless held that "juris-
diction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns 
of the existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a 
patent to pose a risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by 
the patentee. "48 Subsequent cases have made clear that the patent 
holder must take some threatening action directed at the plaintiff 
before the plaintiff can file a declaratory judgment action.49 With re-
spect to the second prong of the pre-Medlmmune standard, which fo-
cused on the declaratory judgment plaintiff's conduct, the Federal 
Circuit has continued to hold that the plaintiff must demonstrate some 
"meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity."50 
This line reached its apotheosis in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology 
v. USPTO ,51 the gene patents case. In that case, the Federal Circuit 
held that "to establish an injury in fact traceable to the patentee, a 
declaratory judgment plaintiff must allege both (1) an affirmative act 
45 Id. at 134. 
46 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
47 Id. at 1380. 
48 Id. at 1381 (emphasis added). 
49 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. , 599 F.3d 1377, 
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that "the fact that [the patent holder] had filed infringement suits 
against other parties ... does not, in the absence of any act directed toward [the plaintiff], meet 
the minimum standard" for jurisdiction). 
so Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc. , 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also SanDisk, 
480 F.3d at 1380 & n.2 (declining to address "the effect of Medimmune , if any, on the second 
prong" of the court of appeals's previous test). 
51 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff din part, 
rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013). 
508 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:498 
by the patentee related to the enforcement of his patent rights, and 
(2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activ-
ity."52 This test is quite similar to that which the Supreme Court dis-
approved in Medlmmune.53 The analysis is roughly the same, just less 
demanding. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has at times described 
Medlmmune's impact solely as "lower[ing] the bar"54 or creating a 
"more lenient legal standard"55 for declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
rather than fundamentally changing the legal analysis. 
The Ass'n for Molecular Pathology plaintiffs were a group of phy-
sicians, medical researchers, and professional organizations, all of 
whom claimed that they were prevented from carrying out diagnostic 
genetic testing by the presence of Myriad's patents on the human 
genes associated with an increased risk of breast cancer.56 The court 
first held that only those plaintiffs against whom Myriad had person-
ally directed patent enforcement efforts could bring an action, despite 
the widespread knowledge that Myriad vigorously enforced its patent 
rights as a general matter.57 Of the three remaining plaintiffs who had 
been the targets of royalty demands, cease-and-desist letters, or the 
like, only one alleged that if the patents were declared invalid he 
would immediately begin genetic testing.58 The court held that this 
plaintiff alone had standing.59 
Other panels of the Federal Circuit have articulated different 
tests for standing in declaratory judgment actions. Some have focused 
on a mirror image theory of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, in 
which a case is justiciable only if there is "an underlying legal cause of 
action that the declaratory defendant could have brought or 
threatened to bring."60 A few have placed the inquiry in the context 
52 Id. at 1318 (citations omitted). 
53 Compare id., with Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
("There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a 
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an 
infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps 
taken with the intent to conduct such activity." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
54 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
55 Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
56 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1313-14. 
51 See id. at 1319. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. In the Supreme Court, Myriad renewed its argument that this remaining plaintiff 
lacked standing. The Court dismissed this argument in a footnote, writing simply that the plain-
tiff had standing under the standard in Medlmmune. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 (2013). 
60 Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (em-
phasis added); see also Powertech Tech. Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 660 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
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of standing or ripeness doctrines more generally.61 More often the 
court has chosen to analyze the justiciability of a particular case di-
rectly under the standards announced in Medlmmune. The court will, 
for example, simply restate Medlmmune's holding that "the funda-
mental inquiry [is] 'whether the facts alleged, under all the circum-
stances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment,' "62 and then proceed 
to focus on the aspect of that statement that seems most directly im-
plicated by the facts of the case.63 These cases appear to tum on ad 
hoc determinations whether both the plaintiff and the defendant have 
done enough for the court to conclude that they are in an active dis-
pute with each other that looks and feels close to an infringement 
action. 
II. A THEORY OF PATENT INJURY 
Although the cases described above take divergent approaches to 
the standing question, they appear to be united in an underlying as-
sumption: "[t]he mere existence of a potentially adverse patent does 
not cause an injury."64 That assumption is incorrect. This Part articu-
lates a different concept of the injury arising from potentially adverse 
patents. 
Intellectual property is an exclusive right. It is a grant that en-
ables its holder to exclude others from taking certain actions that may 
fall within the boundaries of the right. A patent is a right to prevent 
Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Benitec 
Aust!., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). These cases cite Microchip 
Technology Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 441 F .3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2006), a pre-Medimmune 
case which held that "[t]he concepts of 'adverse legal rights' and 'legal risk' used in [prior] cases 
to describe the standard for jurisdiction require that there be an underlying legal cause of action 
that the declaratory defendant could have brought or threatened to bring, if not for the fact that 
the declaratory plaintiff has preempted it." Id. at 943 (emphasis added). 
61 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2991 (2011) (mem.); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 
537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 
1278, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
62 Matthews Int'! Corp. v. Biosafe Eng'g, LLC, 695 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quot-
ing Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). 
63 See id. at 1328-31; see also Danisco U.S. Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 744 F.3d 1325, 1330-33 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasizing the examination is under the totality of the circumstances); Streck, 
Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1282-84 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (focusing on 
"reasonable apprehension of suit" arising from unasserted claims). 
64 Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1338. 
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others from "mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any pat-
ented invention. "65 Patent rights are negative rights that confer the 
ability to exclude others from practicing the invention.66 
But consider what the patent grant means to those others. From 
their perspective, a patent is a form of regulation. It is, as Mark Lem-
ley explains, a "regulatory intervention in the marketplace that is de-
signed to restrict what people can do with their own ideas and their 
own property."67 In the absence of a patent, ideas are freely appropri-
able. As the Supreme Court has explained on numerous occasions, 
the public has a "federal right to copy and to use" that which is not or 
cannot be the subject of intellectual property protection.68 "In gen-
eral, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright 
protects an item, it will be subject to copying."69 The default rule is 
that an inventor or creator has the freedom to invent and create as she 
pleases. The presence of intellectual property, on the other hand, 
places a restraint on that freedom. A patent sets off-as against the 
world-a portion of the public domain that no one can enter without 
permission. It is a regulation of inventors' primary behavior. Such 
persons cannot use the invention without first securing a license to do 
so. Failing that, they are subject to liability. 
But intellectual property rights are uncertain, in several respects. 
First, intellectual property rights are of uncertain validity. Although 
the Patent Act provides that issued patents are presumed valid,70 the 
final determination whether a patent is valid remains for the courts.71 
A patent holder is free of course to try to enforce her rights upon 
grant. But the validity of her holding is not certain until litigation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that this is no minor concern-some stud-
65 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
66 See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 
321, 327-30 (2009). 
67 Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & Pue. PoL'Y 109, 110 
(2013); see also Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEx. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 107, 107-08 (2014). 
68 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. , 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) 
("An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public do-
main and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."). 
69 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 
(2001)). 
70 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."). 
71 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011). 
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ies find that one-third to nearly one-half of patents litigated to judg-
ment will ultimately be found invalid.72 
Second, patent boundaries are often quite uncertain. This uncer-
tainty hampers potential inventors from determining precisely what 
actions or behavior they need to eschew to avoid infringement. In 
brief, patent claims define the metes and bounds of the exclusive right, 
but those claims are written as broadly as possible and often are vague 
or, at the very least, subject to multiple competing interpretations.73 
The process of patent litigation does little to resolve this uncertainty. 
Claim constructions are not definitively resolved until appeaF4 and 
even then the judges of the Federal Circuit disagree sharply about 
how to interpret patent claims.75 
72 The most recent study of litigation outcomes found that 42% of final decisions on valid-
ity result in a judgment of invalidity. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. 
Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REv. 1769, 1787 & 
fig.4 (2014). This is consistent with older studies, despite great changes in patent law. See id. at 
1801 & n.110; see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (reporting 46% invalidity rate for patent valid-
ity challenges litigated to judgment at trial) ; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent 
Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390 (2000) (reporting 
33 % invalidity rate for patent validity challenges litigated to judgment at trial). Of course, these 
studies do not tell us much about the validity of the very large number of patents that are never 
litigated or that are subject to litigation resolved prior to decisions on the merits. But there is 
other evidence suggesting that a large number of invalid patents issue. See JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J . MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT IN-
NOVATORS AT RISK 160-63 (2008) (summarizing evidence). 
73 This phenomenon has been well documented. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 
72, at 54-62; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1744-46 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intel-
lectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 774-75 (2009). 
74 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831_, 840-42 (2015) (holding that 
district court factfinding in claim construction is subject to clear error review but that "ultimate 
interpretation [of a patent claim] is a legal conclusion" reviewed de novo); J. Jonas Anderson & 
Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent 
Claim Construction , 108 Nw. U . L. REv. 1, 40 & tbl.3 (2013) (detailing high Federal Circuit 
reversal rates of district court claim construction rulings) . 
75 See, e.g. , Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). In construing the claim, the majority began by stating, " [i]t is axiomatic that the claim 
construction process entails more than viewing the claim language in isolation," id. at 1305, while 
the dissent began by noting that it is "a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims them-
selves ... define the patented invention," id. at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tions omitted); see also Anderson & Menell, supra note 74, at 6 ("The lack of consensus among 
judges on the Federal Circuit continues to produce uncertainty and confusion for the patent 
system."). 
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As Lemley and Shapiro write, patents are "probabilistic. "76 Be-
cause the right is neither certainly valid nor of certain boundaries, it is 
not a "right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude."77 Now 
consider, once again, the alternative perspective. Those working in a 
field in which there is an extant patent face a risk of infringement 
liability. It is possible that business or investing activity may run afoul 
of the intellectual property. But it is often quite difficult to know with 
any degree of certainty whether particular behavior will do so.78 
That risk is an injury. Economic actors face a present risk of lia-
bility if they wish to engage in activity that might fall within the 
boundaries of the purported exclusive right. In determining whether 
and how to undertake a particular activity, those actors must account 
for that risk and alter their behavior in response. The risk posed by 
intellectual property represents, in any given instant, an actual injury. 
A person wishing to engage in activity that may be the subject of ex-
clusive rights has several choices available to her: she can take a li-
cense, she can ignore the rights and proceed with the activity, she can 
attempt to design around the rights to the extent she can meaningfully 
assess them, or she can abandon the activity altogether. In all events, 
the presence of the intellectual property right in a particular field un-
doubtedly constrains the behavior of those operating in the field. 
This effect is due in no small part to the severity and timing of the 
penalties for infringement. As to the former, patents often are en-
forced through injunctions.79 Infringers must often give up all or part 
of their activity. Substantial damages are also likely. Patent holders 
may be entitled to lost profits or a reasonable royalty.80 But in some 
cases-especially relevant here, where the infringer is on notice of the 
existence of the patent-courts retain the discretion to enhance those 
damages up to three times the awarded amount.81 As to timing, 
neither the validity of the intellectual property right nor the likelihood 
of infringement of that right can be determined with certainty until 
costly litigation is undertaken.82 
In a world in which this uncertainty did not exist, potential in-
fringers could reasonably determine (1) whether they are subject to 
76 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 
75 (2005). 
77 Id. at 75. 
78 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
79 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
so See id. § 284. 
s1 Id. 
82 See supra notes 71- 72, 73-75 and accompanying text. 
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regulation through an existing intellectual property right and, 
(2) whether their planned conduct would violate that regulation. But 
because intellectual property is uncertain, potential infringers must 
make decisions about their behavior in the shadow of a significant 
threat: that, after their decisions have been made, they may be subject 
to injunctive relief and treble damages in an infringement suit.83 
The risk posed by potentially adverse "probabilistic" patents can 
affect regulated persons' or entities' decisionmaking in several ways. 
First, as Christopher Leslie explains in the patent context, the risk of 
infringement liability "can ... increase entry costs by compelling rivals 
to research the patent's validity, to attempt to design around the pat-
ent, or to pay (unnecessary) license fees."84 Each of these responses 
to risk imposes some significant cost. Investigating the validity of in-
tellectual property, for example, usually requires the payment of legal 
fees to produce a "freedom to operate" report.85 Designing around 
requires the expenditure of resources that could otherwise be devoted 
to innovation in the first instance.86 Innovators operating in a field 
occupied by potentially adverse intellectual property may find it diffi-
cult to attract capital or may face increased costs of capital.87 
The risk of infringement usually remains even after these costs 
are incurred. That makes business planning more difficult. As Leslie 
also observed, "it is difficult for the potential entrant to perform a 
proper cost-benefit analysis because it is exceedingly difficult to esti-
mate the probability of prevailing on an invalidity defense in a patent 
infringement suit."88 The result is a potentially strong deterrent ef-
fect.89 In some cases, a firm will find it not worth the risk to undertake 
83 See §§ 283-284. 
84 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2006). 
85 See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
72, 116 (2012) (describing "the need for members of the public to consult with counsel to deter-
mine whether their activities tread on the property rights of others"); see also BESSEN & 
MEURER, supra note 72, at 131-32 (detailing the estimated legal costs of different stages of 
patent litigation). 
86 See Leslie, supra note 84, at 121. 
87 See id. at 119-20. 
88 Id. at 117; see also id. at 133-34 (discussing difficulties of prevailing in litigation). 
89 Others have observed that patents may deter potentially infringing activity. See, e.g., 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 
VA. L. REv. 677, 755 (1986) ("The existence of the patent-and the fear of an infringement 
action-may deter some potential rivals from competing with the patentee and his licensees."); 
David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REv. 677, 698 
(2012) ("Firms that face the prospect of being nickel-and-dimed by owners of dubious patents 
may well choose to refrain from investing in new technologies or entering new markets in the 
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activity that requires investment that can then be held up in the face 
of adverse intellectual property. This is especially so because many 
startups and technology entrepreneurs are rationally risk averse.90 
This effect is especially significant when investments must be 
made over time. Pharmaceutical research and development provides 
an important example of the problem. The process of discovering, de-
veloping, and then securing FDA approval to market a new drug is 
very time consuming and expensive.91 If a drug cannot, for any rea-
son, be marketed, the costs of its development generally are sunk.92 
They cannot meaningfully be reallocated to other projects.93 Pharma-
ceutical firms therefore must make significant asset-specific invest-
ments many years prior to marketing. 
Now consider what happens when there is a potentially adverse 
patent in the field.94 At the time the firm begins making investments 
in research and development, it is uncertain whether the patent is 
valid or whether the firm's ultimate product may infringe.95 The firm 
faces a choice. If it goes ahead, it will make sunk investments of many 
years and many millions of dollars only to face the possibility that 
those investments will be held up by the patent owner, who can 
threaten an injunction or treble damages. Or the firm can abandon 
the project in the face of that risk. Many, perhaps most, rational firms 
will choose the latter. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission found 
in this context that "firms in the biotech industry ... avoid infringing 
questionable patents and therefore will refrain from entering or con-
tinuing with a particular field of research that such patents appear to 
cover. "96 This dynamic is not limited to the pharmaceutical or bio-
first place."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998); Leslie, supra note 84, at 119; 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 CoLUM. L. REv. 207, 218 (2011) 
("Surveys and practitioner accounts show that the risks of litigation and the potentially high 
costs of investigating existing patents deter many firms from pursuing certain lines of research 
and development in the first place."). 
90 See Leslie, supra note 84, at 116-17. 
91 See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEx. 
L. REv. 503, 510-11 & nn.21-22 (2009). 
92 See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Re-
form,]. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 131, 136-37. 
93 See id. 
94 The facts of this discussion roughly mirror those in Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, 
Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), in which the Federal Circuit found that a pharmaceutical 
firm lacked standing to seek a declaration that a patent was invalid. Id. at 1349. 
95 This uncertainty is a function both of the potentially fuzzy boundaries of the patent and 
of the unclear characteristics of the final product. 
96 FED. TRADE CoMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF Co MPETI-
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technology industries. It occurs whenever product development cy-
cles require investment prior to potentially infringing activity. There 
exists some empirical evidence that suggests that such a deterrent ef-
fect is a real and significant obstacle to innovation.97 
So long as intellectual property remains valid, the risk of infringe-
ment liability persists regardless of whether or not the owner takes 
enforcement actions. Judge Learned Hand recognized this dynamic 
when he referred to unenforced but invalid patents as "scare-
crow[ s ]. "98 More colorfully, Leslie refers to such a patent as "a head 
on a pike."99 "Until a court invalidates it, or until the owner explicitly 
disavows it and dedicates it to the public domain," he writes, "every 
patent can give pause to potential competitors who know about it."100 
Ill. STANDING TO REMEDY PATENT INJURY 
Because the Federal Circuit has misconceived the injury in patent 
challenges, it has developed an inappropriate set of standing rules. 
The Federal Circuit's "proximity" approach to standing makes sense 
only if the relevant injury is the infringement action itself. In this Part, 
I argue that standing to resolve the uncertainty posed by issued pat-
TION AND PATENT LAw AND PoucY, Exec. Summary at 5 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
97 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 96, Exec. Summary at 5; Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark 
Schankerman, Enforcement of Patent Rights in the United States, in PATENTS IN THE KNowL-
EDGE-BASED ECONOMY 145, 146 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). Mark 
Lemley is skeptical that deterrence is a significant problem. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Pat-
ents, 2008 M1cH. ST. L. REv. 19, 20 [hereinafter Lemley, Ignoring Patents] ("Both my own expe-
rience and what limited empirical evidence there is suggest that companies do not seem much 
deterred from making products by the threat of all this patent litigation."); Mark A. Lerriley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1516 (2001) [hereinafter Lem-
ley, Rational Ignorance] ("Certainly the issuance of bad patents has the potential to deter compe-
tition that should be lawful in some marginal cases. But this concern can be overstated."). 
Whether or not deterrence occurs as an empirical matter, however, is irrelevant to the standing 
analysis. Actual deterrence is evidence that the risk of IP litigation is concrete and particular-
ized to a particular plaintiff. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. But ignoring the 
risk and pressing forward is a response to the risk, not evidence that the risk does not exist. 
98 Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.); see also 
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993) (quoting Bresnick, 139 F.2d at 
242). 
99 Leslie, supra note 84, at 115. 
100 Id. at 115-16. In related work, Leslie describes a range of threatening actions short of 
filing infringement suit that can deter competitive behavior. These actions include: "publicly 
flaunting one's patent; stating a general intent to sue infringers; accusing competitors of infringe-
ment; threatening competitors' business partners; and licensing activities." Christopher R. Les-
lie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 142-43 (2008). 
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ents is supported by well-established constitutional and prudential 
standing principles.101 
A. Article III Standing 
The Federal Circuit's scheme for determining when a case is justi-
ciable would appear odd to a federal jurisdiction expert. In every 
other area of the law, federal courts apply a familiar framework to 
determine whether there is standing to sue. A plaintiff must demon-
strate that she (1) has suffered or is "under threat of suffering 'injury 
in fact' that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual 
and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;" (2) that injury "must 
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;" and 
(3) "it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or 
redress the injury."102 Although the Federal Circuit sometimes refer-
ences these factors, 103 it does not really grapple with them. Yet, as the 
Supreme Court has reminded the Federal Circuit on several occasions, 
"familiar principles" of law "apply with equal force to disputes arising 
under" the intellectual property statutes.104 
Start with injury in fact. The injury described in Part II consti-
tutes an injury in fact for standing purposes under several lines of Su-
preme Court precedent.105 In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton 
101 I focus here on standing to the exclusion of ripeness. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Medlmmune, often "standing and ripeness boil down to the same question" in scenarios where 
threatened enforcement is at issue. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 
n.8 (2007); see also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3532.5, at 588 n.32 (3d ed. 2008) (noting closeness of 
standing and ripeness requirements in threat-of-prosecution in criminal law). In most prospec-
tive challenges to the scope or validity of patents, the standing and ripeness issues will merge. 
That said, I acknowledge that some actions seeking a declaration of noninfringement will be fact-
specific enough that ripeness is separately at issue. I put those actions aside in this paper. 
102 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). 
103 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
aff din part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
104 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that general stan-
dard for injunctive relief applied in patent cases); see also Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11 
(holding that the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test was inconsistent with more general in-
terpretations of the Declaratory Judgment Act); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999) 
(holding that ordinary standards of judicial review of administrative actions applied to Federal 
Circuit review of PTO factfinding) . 
10s The Court's decision in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013), is not to the 
contrary. In that case, the Court interpreted a covenant not to sue to include all future products. 
Id. at 727-29. In that circumstance, the risk of liability is eliminated. See id. 
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International, Inc.,106 for example, the Court held that a judgment of 
noninfringement does not moot a counterclaim for a declaration that 
a patent is invalid.107 In that case, Morton sued Cardinal Chemical for 
patent infringement.108 Cardinal Chemical counterclaimed for a dec-
laration that the patents in suit were invalid.109 The district court 
found Morton's patents to be invalid and not infringed.110 On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of nonin-
fringement but vacated and dismissed the judgment of invalidity, rea-
soning that because the patent was not infringed, no case or 
controversy remained with respect to validity .111 The Supreme Court 
reversed. As described above, the Court first drew a distinction be-
tween claims of infringement and validity.112 The Court then de-
scribed the injury that would give rise to independent jurisdiction over 
the validity claim in terms very similar to those used above. The 
Court explained that the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to 
relieve actors of "an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a 
growing potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment 
of their enterprises" by allowing suit to "clear the air."113 The Court 
concluded that "[m]erely the desire to avoid the threat of a 'scare-
crow' patent, in Learned Hand's phrase, may therefore be sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act."114 A 
judgment of noninfringement in a suit brought by a right holder, in the 
Court's view, did nothing to address the ongoing risk arising from the 
exclusive right: "A company once charged with infringement must re-
main concerned about the risk of similar charges if it develops and 
markets similar products in the future." 115 Medlmmune follows a sim-
ilar logic. In rejecting the requirement that a licensee breach its con-
tract before challenging the validity of the underlying patent, the 
106 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
101 See id. at 96. 
108 Id. at 85-86. 
109 Id. at 86. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. at 87. 
112 See id. at 96. 
113 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. 
Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 , 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
114 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239,242 (2d Cir. 
1943)). 
115 Id. at 99-100. The Court 's holding in Cardinal Chemical was limited to the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court. Id. at 95. Nevertheless, because it was discussing the constitutional case 
or controversy requirement, its dicta concerning the scope of the injury remains persuasive. 
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Court necessarily acknowledged that the plaintiff was injured even 
though it was not presently subject to an enforcement action. 116 
More broadly, recognizing that the risk or uncertainty posed by 
extant intellectual property is an injury in fact is consistent with sev-
eral familiar standing principles. The first is that probabilistic harms 
can constitute injury in fact. This notion received its most prominent 
expression in Massachusetts v. EPA,117 in which the Supreme Court 
held that the state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the 
EPA's failure to take action to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
under the Clean Air Act.118 The injury in that case was probabilistic; 
it was a risk of harm from global warming. Nevertheless, the Court 
held that EPA's "refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'im-
minent.' "119 A decision in Massachusetts' favor-compelling the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions-would reduce the risk of harm 
that Massachusetts faced. 120 Similarly, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms,121 the Court held that conventional alfalfa farmers had 
standing to challenge the Department of Agriculture's decision to der-
egulate genetically modified alfalfa because that decision created "a 
significant risk of gene flow to non-genetically-engineered varieties of 
alfalfa," and because that risk harmed the farmers in a variety of ways 
"even if their crops are not actually infected with" the genetically 
modified seed.122 
A series of lower court decisions have staked out similar posi-
tions. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has held that "increases in risk 
can at times be 'injuries in fact' sufficient to confer standing"123 and 
has applied that holding to find that an environmental group had 
standing to challenge EPA regulations that it alleged created an in-
creased risk of cancer for its members. 124 So too, the Second Circuit 
116 See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132-33 & n.11 (2007). 
117 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
us See id. at 526. 
119 Id. at 521 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see id. at 
521-23 (describing risks associated with increased greenhouse gas emissions). 
120 Id. at 525-26. 
121 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
122 Id. at 155. 
123 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
124 Id. at 6-7 (holding that a "lifetime risk that an individual will develop nonfatal skin 
cancer" of "about 1 in 200,000" is "sufficient to support standing"); see also Mountain States 
Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that increased risk of 
forest fire created by a Forest Service logging rule was sufficient to support group's standing to 
challenge rule) . 
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held in a case challenging the FDA's decision to permit the use of 
downed livestock as food for human consumption that "enhanced 
risk" was "cognizable for standing purposes, where the plaintiff al-
leges exposure to potentially harmful products."125 And the Seventh 
Circuit has held that "even a small probability of injury is sufficient to 
create a case or controversy-to take a suit out of the category of the 
hypothetical-provided of course that the relief sought would, if 
granted, reduce the probability."126 
To be sure, these cases are in tension with the Court's cases hold-
ing that speculative future injuries do not give rise to standing.127 In 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,128 for example, the Court held that a 
plaintiff who had previously been subject to a police "chokehold" did 
not have standing to seek an injunction against future police use of the 
maneuver because he could only state a "subjective apprehension[ ]" 
that the event might occur again in the future.129 In Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife ,130 the Court famously denied standing to plaintiffs to 
challenge an Interior Department determination that the Endangered 
Species Act applied only to domestic activities when they could only 
assert that they might one day travel to foreign countries, where the 
Department's rule made it less likely they would be able to see endan-
gered species.131 Most recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International 
USA,132 the Court held that plaintiffs challenging the government's 
warrantless wiretapping authority under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act lacked standing because the risk that they might be sub-
12s Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003). 
126 Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.). 
127 The courts of appeals are split on the issue as well. See, e.g. , Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'I 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Sentelle, J ., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004); Baur, 352 
F.3d at 651 & n.3 (Pooler, J., dissenting). There is also debate among the courts of appeals and 
in the academic literature over whether all increases in risk constitute injury in fact or whether 
only a subset of risks that are judged sufficiently substantial should qualify. See, e.g., F. Andrew 
Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 55, 61-65 (2012) (describing caselaw that 
finds injury in fact only when risk is sufficiently high); Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? 
The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 91 GEO. L.J. 391, 403-04 (2009) (arguing that 
risk thresholds are unique to the D.C. Circuit). 
128 City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
129 Id. at 105--07 & n.8. 
130 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
131 Id. at 558-64 ("Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans, 
or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be-do not support a finding of the 
'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require."). 
132 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'I USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
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ject to government monitoring was too speculative and actions taken 
to mitigate therefore were unreasonable.133 
The Court's cases in this area are notoriously difficult to harmo-
nize. But there are reasons to believe, at the very least, that they do 
not preclude standing for plaintiffs who assert the injury in fact arising 
from IP described above.134 As several scholars have recently argued, 
there is a conceptual distinction between actual, that is, present, inju-
ries based on uncertain facts and threatened future injuries.135 An-
drew Hessick argues that "[a] plaintiff facing a threat of injury from a 
defendant's illegal conduct . .. has an interest in preventing that injury 
from occurring, or at least an interest in reducing the risk of its occur-
rence. "136 This interest is a case or controversy under Article III "[s]o 
long as (1) the challenged activity increases the plaintiff's risk of suf-
fering harm and (2) a judicial order could stop the challenged activity, 
thereby removing the increased risk of harm."137 Taking a slightly dif-
ferent approach, Jonathan Remy Nash argues that the risk of injury 
can be characterized in terms of expected value, proceeding from the 
common sense premise that one can assign a dollar value to various 
risks.138 In his view, "[i]f a positive expected value would be sufficient 
to support standing were it to arise as a typical 'actual harm,' then the 
expected value should be deemed sufficient to support standing. "139 
In other words, when a risk has present effect, the risk itself is the 
actual injury and a person who experiences that risk in a concrete and 
particularized manner has standing to sue to bring about action that 
may reduce or eliminate the risk. 
The difficult question then is how to sort such presently existing 
injuries from speculative future harms. Of particular relevance here, 
133 Id. at 1142-43. 
134 The Court appeared to be skeptical of this theory of IP standing in Already, LLC v. 
Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 730-31 (2013). But the Court in that case construed the relevant 
covenant to completely eliminate any risk of infringement liability for past, present, or future 
activities. See id. at 727-29. Its statements regarding risk-based theories of standing are there-
fore dicta. 
135 See Hessick, supra note 127, at 65; Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing's Expected Value, 111 
M1cH. L. REv. 1283, 1307 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 Su P. CT. REv. 37, 
47-51; cf Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. Cow. L. REv. 1117, 
1161-65 (2013) (drawing similar distinction with respect to harms occurring in potential privacy 
breaches). 
136 Hessick, supra note 127, at 66. 
137 Id. at 67; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Reme-
dies-And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 698-99 (2006) (arguing 
for low bar to standing for threatened injuries). 
138 See Nash, supra note 135, at 1284. 
139 Nash, supra note 135, at 1306. 
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the Court appears more likely to find standing on the basis of present 
risk when the plaintiff is within or very close to the zone of primary 
conduct regulation and the costs of uncertainty are high. Consider 
two lines of decisions. The first are cases that confer standing on 
plaintiffs seeking to challenge the validity of statutes or regulations 
before they are enforced. As the Supreme Court noted in Medlm-
mune, "where threatened action by government is concerned, we do 
not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit 
to challenge the basis for the threat-for example, the constitutional-
ity of a law threatened to be enforced."140 In the First Amendment 
context, for example, the Court has emphasized that standing is ap-
propriate where the "alleged danger ... is ... one of self-censorship; a 
harm that can be realized even without" enforcement.141 The Court 
has similarly held with respect to criminal prohibitions that "it is not 
necessary that [ a litigant] first expose himself to actual arrest or prose-
cution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the 
exercise of his constitutional rights."142 
In these cases, the plaintiff is subject to regulation by the govern-
ment. There is a statute telling him what he can or cannot do. And 
the penalties for noncompliance are high-the plaintiff either ceases 
otherwise constitutionally protected activity or risks criminal sanc-
tions. IP validity litigation follows this structure. There is an exclusive 
right in place that purports to regulate others in the field; they must 
avoid the subject matter of the right or take a license.143 The penalties 
for not doing so are high-injunctive relief and significant damages 
awards.144 But the lawfulness of the regulation is uncertain.145 In 
those circumstances, the plaintiff need not risk liability before bring-
ing suit. 
140 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007) (emphasis omitted). 
141 Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988). 
142 Steffel v. Thompson, 415,U.S. 452, 459 (1974); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (allowing pre-enforcement review of statute where credible threat of prose-
cution existed); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'! Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (same); 
13B WruoHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 101, § 3532.5, at 585-86 (" If there is a present 
desire to engage in apparently crinlinal activity . . . existence of a crinlinal prohibition should 
alone be sufficient basis for adjudication. Fear that courts may find the statute valid will deter 
many from risking violation; defense of criminal proceedings on constitutional grounds simply is 
not an adequate remedy."). 
143 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
144 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2012). 
145 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
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Consider too another source of analogy: real property.146 We or-
dinarily presume, as the Medlmmune court noted, that a developer of 
real property need not build on that property before going to court to 
clear title to the property. 147 Indeed, it has long been recognized that 
resolving disputes over property prior to fixed costs being incurred is a 
legitimate use of the courts.148 Federal courts appear to follow this 
presumption.149 There is little difference for standing purposes be-
tween a real estate developer confronting uncertain land title and an 
innovator confronting uncertain intellectual property in her field. 
Each experiences a present injury from the uncertainty in the underly-
ing property rights, and each ought to be able to sue to clear the field 
prior to making costly investments. 
These kinds of injuries are distinguishable from those found in-
sufficient for standing in Defenders of Wildlife, Lyons, and Clapper. 
Take Defenders of Wildlife, to start. In that case, there was no ques-
tion that the "plaintiff's asserted injury ar[ose] from the government's 
allegedly unlawful regulation . . . of someone else. "150 The Court 
therefore characterized the plaintiffs' injuries not as a present risk of 
harm, but as threatened harm that would arise upon the unfolding of a 
long chain of events, none of which were particularly imminent. 151 
146 My argument from real property is limited. I do not make any claim that intellectual 
and real property are broadly similar. Cf Mark A . Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1031-32 (2005) (arguing that real property's "free riding" 
rhetoric is misguided as applied to intellectual property). I note only the parallel structure of the 
justiciability problem: in both cases, one litigant must make decisions under a cloud of uncer-
tainty with potentially far-reaching consequences. 
147 See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 133-34 (2007); Lemley, Ignoring 
Patents, supra note 97, at 23 ("If I want to build a house, I'd better be darn sure that I own the 
land on which the house is built."). 
148 See BoRCHARD, supra note 26, at 741. 
149 Because most property litigation takes place in state courts, the question who has stand-
ing under Article III to clear title to real property arises only rarely. In Medlmmune, the Court 
described the facts of a prior case, Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U.S. 274 (1928), in 
which a lessee brought suit to remove a "cloud" on its lease, and observed that there would 
likely have been standing under the (subsequently enacted) Declaratory Judgment Act. See 549 
U.S. at 133-34. The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2012), authorizes suit against the United 
States "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an inter-
est." Id. § 2409a(a). Courts have held that there is broad standing under the Act to remedy the 
effects of uncertainty as to land titles. See, e.g., Avista Corp. v. Sanders Cnty., 405 F. App'x 225, 
226 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The injury to Avista is caused by the Jack of resolution of the question of 
land ownership. The requested relief of resolution of the title dispute and a determination of the 
owner of the right of way would redress that injury."); United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 
1240 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding Article III standing to intervene in action to settle land title 
dispute). 
150 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
151 See id. at 564---65. 
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The plaintiff's "apprehension" about the chokehold procedure in Ly-
ons was "subjective" because the authorization for such a move, if 
any, did not directly impact the plaintiff's current behavior.152 So too 
in Clapper, the risk that one of the plaintiffs might have her communi-
cations intercepted was speculative because the wiretapping was di-
rected at someone else and it would only be through a long chain of 
happenstance that the plaintiffs found themselves caught up in the in-
terceptions.153 The Clapper court went further, and held that steps the 
plaintiffs undertook to minimize their risk did not themselves estab-
lish standing, but that holding only follows logically from the first. 154 
The risk of harm arising from invalid IP is, if nothing else, signifi-
cantly more direct than in the cases above. In an IP validity case, the 
plaintiff is the object of the regulation. The only barriers to liability 
are the plaintiff's choice to engage in activity that may fall within the 
IP holder's exclusive right and the IP holder's choice to enforce those 
rights. That is precisely the same structure described in the cases al-
lowing pre-enforcement challenges to government statutes or rules. 155 
As the Court held in Medlmmune, it makes no difference whether the 
enforcement of proscriptions on primary conduct is in the hands of the 
government or private individuals.156 In either circumstance, the 
plaintiff faces a risk of enforcement that forces changes to its present 
behavior. 
With a proper understanding of the nature of the injury in claims 
alleging that intellectual property is invalid, causation and redres-
sability follow with considerably greater ease.157 For an injury to be 
the subject of judicial relief, it must be "fairly traceable" to the defen-
dant. 158 There must be "a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of."159 The defendant's conduct must be a 
"but for" cause of the injury,160 and the causal chain between the in-
jury and the defendant cannot be so attenuated that there is no "sub-
stantial likelihood" that the relief sought will redress the injury.161 
152 See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-107 & nn.7-8 (1983). 
153 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int') USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148-50 (2013). 
154 See id. at 1150-51. 
155 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
156 See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118, 128-33 (2007). 
157 See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 101, § 3531.5, at 305 ("The choice 
among alternative definitions of the injury may control the determination of causation."). 
158 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted). 
159 Id. 
160 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 (1978). 
161 Vt. Agency of Nat') Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). 
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The injury described above-increased risk and uncertainty-is 
caused by the existence vel non of intellectual prope1ty in a given 
field. So long as the intellectual property remains, it can serve as a 
scarecrow and create a meaningful risk of liability for others working 
in the field. 162 The existence of the intellectual property, in tum, is 
caused both by the right holder and the PTO, the government agency 
responsible for issuing the patent. Under traditional standing princi-
ples, either is an acceptable defendant in an action challenging the 
validity of intellectual property .163 
In an action against a private party seeking to invalidate that 
party's intellectual property, the injury described above arises from 
the defendant's having acquired and then subsequently holding or 
maintaining the intellectual property. A patent only comes into being 
through actions of the inventor. An inventor must apply to the PTO 
for a patent.164 In so doing, the inventor defines the patent's scope 
and bound~ries.165 She does more than merely conjure up the patent; 
she affirmatively shapes the risks to which she exposes others. A pat-
ent applicant must disclose her new, useful, and nonobvious invention 
and must conclude her application with "one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
inventor ... regards as the invention. "166 The patent applicant drafts 
the claims, which define the scope of the invention, its metes and 
bounds.167 Patentees usually try to draft their claims as broadly as 
possible.168 And as a practical matter, patentees then engage in a ne-
gotiation with the patent examiner with the goal of having as broad a 
claim as possible issue.169 The patent holder then holds her intellec-
tual property and often must take affirmative steps to maintain it, 
such as by paying periodic maintenance fees to the PTO.170 
162 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
163 For the purpose of this argument, I am agnostic about which is the proper defendant as 
a matter of policy. I address that question infra Part IV.C. 
164 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
165 See id. 
166 Id. § 112{b ). 
167 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (describing the 
claim as "the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee's rights"); 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) {"It is a bedrock principle 
of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the 
right to exclude." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
168 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1762-63. 
169 See Michael J . Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1747, 1756 & 
nn.42-43 (2011). 
110 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 4l{b)(l). 
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Of course, the PTO also directly causes the injury when it issues a 
patent. Because patents do not exist absent government action, the 
agency that takes such action is a but-for cause of the risk that arises 
upon .their issuance. It is true in a sense that causation is shared be-
tween the applicant and the government. In order for a patent to 
come into existence, an applicant needs to file an application and then 
the government needs to approve the application and issue the pat-
ent.171 Both are necessary causes of the injury and neither is a suffi-
cient cause alone. But such shared causation does not ordinarily 
defeat standing.172 
Redressability, finally, is straightforward. The risk caused by un-
certain patents is removed when the patent's validity or boundaries 
are adjudicated. A judicial finding that a patent is invalid has preclu-
sive effect against the owner.173 It is a finding that is good in any sub-
sequent litigation. In appeals of administrative actions, the result of a 
judicial finding of invalidity would be to order the agency to cancel the 
patent.174 
B. Prudential Standing 
Quite apart from Article III standing, the courts have developed 
various theories of "prudential" standil)g: "flexible rules of federal ap-
pellate practice designed to protect the courts from deciding abstract 
questions of wide public significance . . . when other governmental 
institutions may be more competent to address the questions."175 
They are "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal ju-
risdiction"176 that are "designed to deny standing as a matter of judi-
cial prudence rather than constitutional command."177 The question 
whether a patent challenger has standing under Article III is in some 
ways distinct from the question whether any particular challenger is 
171 See id. §§ 111, 151. 
172 See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 101, § 3531.5, at 311-15 & n.30 ("It 
may be enough that the defendant's conduct is one among multiple causes." (citing cases)). 
173 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334, 350 (1971). 
174 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 32l(b). 
175 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (internal quotation marks, altera-
tions, and citation omitted). 
176 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
177 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 101, § 3531.7, at 513. There is some de-
bate over whether prudential standing requirements, like constitutional standing requirements, 
are "jurisdictional" in the sense that parties cannot waive or forfeit them. See, e.g. , Grocery 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184-85 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J ., dissenting) 
(identifying circuit split and arguing that prudential standing is not jurisdictional). I s~t this 
debate aside for the purpose of the analysis that follows. 
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an appropriate plaintiff. Indeed, the latter question more than the 
former seems to drive much of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in 
this area. 
Neither the Federal Circuit nor any other court has developed a 
consistent theory of prudential standing to challenge the validity of a 
patent. In other areas of the law, however, prudential standing princi-
ples operate primarily to limit standing to instances where statutory 
objectives are achieved rather than undermined.178 Most broadly, for 
example, in the context of challenges to administrative action under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, the court has required plaintiffs to 
show that the interests they assert are "arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute" that provides the 
relevant decisional law.179 This test asks whether the plaintiff is 
among the class of persons protected by the statute, and whether her 
alleged injury is among the sorts of interests that the statute was de-
signed to protect.180 
In a similar vein are well-developed principles of prudential 
standing in particular fields. Take antitrust, for example.181 Section 4 
of the Clayton Act provides broadly that "any person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained. "182 But the Supreme Court has long held that this general Ian-
178 See, e.g., Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12 (1987) (stating that the 
"zone of interest" inquiry "seeks to exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frus-
trate than to further statutory objectives"). 
179 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see Match-E-
Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012). This 
test has its origin in an interpretation of section 702 of the APA, which provides that "[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (2012). Although some cases have suggested that the zone of interests formulation is 
"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of§ 702," Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16, and 
therefore limited to suits brought under the APA, other cases suggest that the formulation is 
applicable more broadly. See, e.g. , Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011) 
(interpreting parallel language in Title VII). 
180 See Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990). 
181 See, e.g. , Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264, 1270 
(11th Cir. 2013) ("The doctrine of antitrust standing reflects prudential concerns and is designed 
to avoid burdening the courts with speculative or remote claims. Antitrust standing is a consci-
entious method to find the proper private plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws." (citation omit-
ted)); Gatt Commc'ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs. , 711 F.3d 68, 82 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (Wesley, J., 
concurring) ("Antitrust standing involves an analysis of prudential considerations aimed at 
avoiding counter-productive use of antitrust laws in ways that could harm competition rather 
than protecting it." (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). 
182 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). The Clayton Act also provides that "[a]ny person .. . shall be 
2015] RETHINKING STANDING IN PATENT CHALLENGES 527 
guage is "implicitly qualified."183 These qualifications are primarily 
twofold. The first is that the plaintiff must successfully allege "anti-
trust injury." That is, the plaintiff's alleged injury must not only con-
stitute an injury in fact sufficient to invoke the court's Article III 
jurisdiction, but it must also be an "injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which mRkes 
defendants' acts unlawful."184 The facts of the germinal case offer a 
good example of the concept. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, lnc. ,185 the plaintiffs were bowling alleys that challenged on anti-
trust grounds the merger of their struggling competitor with a well-
financed supplier that would enable the competitor to remain via-
ble.186 Even assuming that the merger was a violation of the antitrust 
laws, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing 
to bring their claim because their theory of injury-that they would be 
injured because they would face competition from the newly rejuve-
nated bowling alley-was exactly the opposite of the injury that the 
antitrust laws were meant to remedy.187 The plaintiffs were com-
plaining of more competition, while the antitrust laws were intended 
to provide remedies for injuries arising from less competition. The 
modem "antitrust injury" rule operates to limit antitrust actions to 
those in which the plaintiff's action supports the statutory goal of anti-
trust enforcement.188 
The second major limitation of antitrust standing is to plaintiffs 
whose injuries are not too remote, derivative, or duplicative of 
others.189 Because antitrust violations ripple through the economy, a 
potentially very large number of plaintiffs can plausibly claim Article 
III injury. Antitrust law therefore favors direct rather than derivative 
plaintiffs. If, for example, a supplier is overcharged as a result of ille-
gal price fixing, the supplier's customers-the "indirect purchasers" in 
antitrust parlance-generally do not have antitrust standing, at least in 
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage by a violation 
of the antitrust laws." Id. § 26. 
183 UA PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HoVENKAMP, RoaER D . BLAIR & CHRISTINE PI-
ETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAw 'I 335, at 67 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter AREEDA & 
HoVENKAMP]; see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U .S. 519, 534-35 (1983). 
184 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
185 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
186 See id. at 479-81. 
187 See id. at 487-89. 
188 See IIA AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 337, at 88. 
189 See id. 'I 339, at 108. 
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actions seeking damages.190 That is because such damages actions are 
duplicative of actions that can be brought by more direct purchasers. 
Efficient litigation therefore favors the direct purchasers. 
Together, these doctrines add up to a rough preference for certain 
plaintiffs over others in antitrust cases. Consumers, for example, are 
usually the preferred plaintiffs. This is consistent with each of the lim-
itations described above. Consumers are the most likely to be injured 
in a way that the antitrust laws are meant to prevent-by having to 
pay unlawfully higher prices for goods and services. And consumers 
are the most direct plaintiffs, thereby making for efficient litigation 
(particularly when suit is brought on behalf of a class of consumers). 
This is not to say that other plaintiffs are excluded. But they do have 
to demonstrate their suitability. As the leading antitrust treatise 
notes, "consumers almost always have the correct incentives for suit[;] 
rivals do not."191 That is because "a competitor opposes efficient, ag-
gressive, and legitimate competition by its rivals," and therefore "it 
has an incentive to use an antitrust suit to delay their operations or to 
induce them to moderate their competition. "192 But in cases where 
the wrongful conduct is exclusionary, such as predatory pricing, then a 
competitor's incentives are aligned with the ultimate consumer benefi-
ciaries of the law.193 Similarly, where a competitor is in a better posi-
tion to detect antitrust violations than a consumer, or where collective 
action problems may plague consumer suits, a competitor may be an 
appropriate plaintiff.194 
For a contrasting example, consider false advertising cases 
brought under section 43 of the Lanham Act.195 That statute provides 
that "any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be dam-
aged by" false advertising may sue.196 In those cases, however, and 
unlike in antitrust cases, competitors are the preferred plaintiffs rather 
than consumers.197 That is because the purpose of the Lanham Act is 
190 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-35 (1977). By contrast, the concerns with 
duplicative recovery raised in damages actionJ are not present in actions seeking only injunctive 
relief. Those actions may therefore usually be brought even by indirect purchasers. See 
AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 346d & n.23, at 166 (citing In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000)). . 
191 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 348a, at 202. 
192 Id. 
193 See id. ; see also, e.g. , Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 223 (1993). 
194 See AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 348a, at 202. 
195 15 u.s.c. § 1125 (2012). 
196 Id. § 1125(a)(l). 
197 Indeed, courts have uniformly held that consumers do not have prudential standing to 
2015] RETHINKING STANDING IN PATENT CHALLENGES 529 
different from the purpose of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Unlike 
the antitrust laws, which ultimately are about consumer welfare,198 the 
Lanham Act aims to curb unfair competition.199 The different statu-
tory purpose yields a different set of potential plaintiffs who may fall 
within the zone of interests that the statute protects. As the Supreme 
Court has recently held, a Lanham Act false advertising plaintiff "or-
dinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly 
from the deception wrought by the defendant's advertising."200 Direct 
competitors whose economic interests are injured by false advertising 
are the most straightforward plaintiffs.201 But noncompetitors can sue 
when their alleged injuries are still within the scope of interests pro-
tected by the statute.202 The reasons are two-fold. First, the modern 
economy includes a range of market structures such that indirect com-
petitors may nevertheless be subject to injury from unfair competition 
in the commercial marketplace. Entities may have conflicting inter-
ests even if they are located at different levels of a supply chain,203 or 
compete in adjacent but not identical product markets.204 Second, 
there may be cases in which more appropriate plaintiffs have little 
incentive to sue.205 In those cases, more remote plaintiffs can still vin-
dicate the interests protected by the statute. But those plaintiffs need 
to demonstrate more convincingly that standing is appropriate.206 
sue under section 43(a)(l}. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Foods, Inc., 365 F.3d 
278, 280 (4th Cir. 2008); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692-93 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
198 See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221. 
199 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating that the Act is intended "to protect persons engaged in .. . 
commerce against unfair competition"). To be sure, the Lanham Act also seeks to protect con-
sumers from false advertising. See 5 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 27:31 (4th ed. 2014) (noting that"§ 43(a) was passed to protect consum-
ers as well as competitors," and describing "commercial plaintiff[s]" as '"vicarious avenger[s]' of 
consumer interests"). The courts' denial of standing to consumer plaintiffs reflects congressional 
intent to exclude those plaintiffs. 
200 Lexmark Int'!, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 (2014). 
201 See, e.g., id. at 1393 (noting that "the classic Lanham Act false-advertising claim [is one] 
in which one competitor directly injures another by making false statements about his own goods 
or the competitor's goods and thus inducing consumers to switch" (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)); see also Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 113 (2d 
Cir. 2010), abrogated in part on other grounds, Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377. 
202 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1393-95 (holding that competitor's supplier had standing to 
bring false advertising claim). 
203 See, e.g., Famous Horse, 624 F.3d at 113. 
204 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc. , 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980). 
20s See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Side at 20, Lexmark, 
134 S. Ct. 1377 (No. 12-873) (citing Merck Eprova AG v. Brookstone Phann., LLC, 920 F. Supp. 
2d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), as an example). 
206 See Famous Horse, 624 F.3d at 113. 
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Together, these limitations seek to effectuate two prudential con-
cerns. The first has to do primarily with congressional intent. When 
courts ask whether a plaintiff's injury falls within the "zone of inter-
ests" created by a statute-or whether a plaintiff has experienced "an-
titrust injury" or "competitive injury" for purposes of the Lanham 
Act-they are inquiring whether Congress intended for the courts to 
intervene in the way they are being asked.207 As the Supreme Court 
has stated in the APA context, the question is whether "the plaintiff's 
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes 
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that con-
gress intended to permit the suit. "208 Second, there are circumstances 
in which it is appropriate for courts to consider the structure and func-
tion of litigation in determining who are proper plaintiffs.209 
How do these considerations map onto patent validity chal-
lenges? Any assessment of the relevant zone of interests must begin 
with the Patent Act.210 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal 
Circuit has defined the "zone of interests" created by the Patent Act 
in those terms precisely.211 But some well-understood principles point 
the way. It is widely accepted that the purpose of the patent law is to 
promote innovation. This purpose is reflected both in the constitu-
207 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388-90; Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 (1987) 
("[A]t bottom the reviewability question turns on congressional intent .. . . "). 
208 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. 
209 Note, however, that courts' authority to consider matters of judicial prudence does not 
extend so far as to enable courts to engage in free-wheeling policymaking concerning standing 
requirements. See, e.g. , Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 289 (1992) 
(Scalia, J. , concurring) (noting that concerns over the threat of nuisance litigation may be rele-
vant but "are surely not alone enough to restrict standing to purchasers or sellers under a text 
that contains no hint of such a limitation"). 
210 Unlike the antitrust or unfair competition laws, or the APA, the Patent Act does not 
contain an express cause of action for persons seeking to challenge the scope or validity of a 
patent. Section 281 provides only that " (a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for in-
fringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). As described above, the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act forms the basis for most present-day patent challenges, and the Patent Act's provisions 
for judicial review of post-grant challenges in the PTO furnishes statutory authority for another 
class of challenges. See infra Part I; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b). 
211 In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Federal 
Circuit rejected the idea that the zone of interests included a broad conception of " the public 
good." Id. at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is probably correct. Such a wide 
zone of interests could swallow all of prudential standing, since arguably every statute that Con-
gress passes purports to protect the public good. I part ways here with those scholars who seek 
to expand standing to include citizen suits. See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 20; Amelia Smith 
Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 361, 392-400 (2013). 
The Supreme Court is also highly unlikely to sanction such suits given its hostility to statutory 
citizen suit provisions expressed in Defenders of Wildlife and subsequent cases. See supra notes 
179-80 and accompanying text; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-78 (1992). 
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tional grant of authority to Congress to promulgate a patent act "[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"212 and in the text 
and structure of the Patent Act itself.213 Of course, "promoting inno-
vation" is hardly self-defining. Innovation promotion could encom-
pass a wide range of activities and a wide range of social goals, from 
the production of new goods and services to the preservation of com-
petition to the distribution of goods and services throughout the econ-
omy .214 If nothing else, however, the promotion of innovation must 
entail creating incentives to engage in the production of new and use-
ful goods and services. That utilitarian goal is the classic justification 
for the patent system, as recognized both by scholars215 and by the 
courts.216 Equally well understood is that the patent system is limited, 
again, as both a constitutional and a statutory matter. The statute is 
thought to balance the incentives for invention provided by a grant of 
exclusive rights with the "recognition that imitation and refinement 
through imitation are ... necessary to invention itself and the very 
lifeblood of a competitive economy."217 
This suggests that the zone of interests surrounding the Patent 
Act centers upon incentives to innovate. The Patent Act articulates 
the bases for and conditions upon granting patents,218 enumerates the 
rights that attach to a patent grant,219 and provides for remedies that 
patent holders may secure against infringers.220 These provisions are 
all the subjects of legislative and judicial change based on the extent 
to which they promote or retard incentives to innovate. And, because 
ensuring that the PTO issues only valid grants is important to innova-
tion, Congress has provided mechanisms for parties to challenge the 
validity of patents in the agency.221 Christina Bohannon and Herbert 
Hovenkamp fashion these well-understood purposes of the patent 
212 U .S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
213 The Supreme Court consistently refers to this statutory purpose. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. , 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
214 See Brett Frischmann & Mark McKenna, Comparative Analysis of (Innovation) Failures 
and Institutions in Context (Sept. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The George 
Washington Law Review). 
215 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HAND-
BOOK OF LAw AND EcoNoMrcs 1473, 1476 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
216 See, e.g. , Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013) (stating that "the very point of patents" is "to promote creation"); Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. , Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
217 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146; see also, e.g., Mayo , 132 S. Ct. at 1301-02. 
218 35 u.s.c. §§ 101-112 (2012). 
219 Id. § 154(d). 
220 Id. §§ 271, 281-284. 
221 See id. §§ 311-319; 321-329; Mata!, supra note 11 (legislative history). 
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laws into a concept of "IP injury."222 Their argument proceeds by 
analogy to the concept of antitrust injury described above. Just as an-
titrust actions are limited to those which promote competition, not-
withstanding the seemingly broad statutory standing for all persons to 
challenge antitrust violations, so too, they argue, should actions to en-
force patent rights be limited to those where the plaintiff can 
"demonstr[ate] injury that is tied to the purpose for which the IP laws 
were passed in the first place."223 They argue that "IP law should rec-
ognize harm"-infringement-"only for uses that are likely to inter-
fere with IP holders' decisions to create or distribute their works-
that is, only for harms that are consistent with the constitutional man-
date that the purpose of the patent . . . system[ ] is to further 
innovation. "224 
Bohannon and Hovenkamp's theory of IP injury works just as 
well in reverse. If the zone of interests protected by the patent law is 
innovation incentives, then challengers to the scope or validity of pat-
ents have prudential standing if they allege harm to innovation incen-
tives. To be sure, this concept is expansive. But it is not boundless.225 
It does not, for example, include broad notions of consumer welfare. 
Unlike the antitrust laws, the Patent Act is not a consumer welfare 
statute.226 It does not aim to keep prices at competitive levels; to the 
contrary, it aims to induce innovation through supracompetitive pric-
ing. And the concerns that courts express about patent breadth or 
scope are almost always framed in terms of the effect of patent 
strength on innovation, not on prices. 227 
The injury described in Part I fits squarely within this zone of 
interests. Risk and uncertainty about the scope and validity of patents 
directly affect the innovative process. Those who seek to develop or 
market competing goods that may infringe are rationally "chilled" and 
222 See CHRISTINA BOHANNON & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RE-
STRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RlvALRY IN INNOVATION 50-55 (2012). 
223 Id. at 51. 
224 Id.; see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 lowA L. 
REV. 747, 751-53 (2013). 
225 Cf Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim 
that "the patent statute's 'zone of interests' encompasses any member of the public who per-
ceives they will be harmed by an issued patent which they believe to be invalid"). 
226 Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U .S. 477, 485-87 (1977), with 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. , 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). See also Ritz Camera 
& Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 507--08 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
221 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 
(2012). 
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choose not to do so.228 As described above, a definitive adjudication 
of the scope or validity of a patent can clear the way for innovative , 
activity that might not otherwise take place.229 If the patent is found · 
valid, then the parties can bargain toward an efficient license and in-
novation can proceed under the terms of the license.230 If it is invalid, 
then the innovation can proceed unencumbered. Either way, remov-
ing the cloud of title for the party seeking to make unlicensed use is in 
furtherance of the fundamental goal of the patent system, which is to 
incentivize innovation. It therefore falls within the zone of interests of 
the statute. 
As to the second concern of prudential standing doctrine, which 
attempts to avoid duplicative or wasteful litigation, allowing standing 
for plaintiffs who allege the injury described above would generally 
not pose a problem. Actions adjudicating the scope or validity of pat-
ents do not present the problems of duplicative recovery that antitrust 
damage actions present.231 Declaratory relief is equitable in nature.232 
Because there are no damages, there is no risk to the defendants of 
duplicative awards and over-recoveries to the plaintiffs. This explains 
why even in antitrust, prudential standing restrictions like the indirect 
purchaser rule are relaxed when the plaintiff is seeking only injunctive 
relief.233 Jt also explains why standing under the Lanham Act tends to 
be broader than antitrust standing. Most false advertising cases_ seek 
only injunctive relief.234 To be sure, there may be situations in which 
judicial economy concerns favor channeling declaratory relief to par-
ticular plaintiffs; I discuss those situations in the next section. But as a 
general matter, there is no reason to think that a broadly restrictive 
prudential standing rule is justified on the ground that it· is necessary 
to prevent injustice.235 
228 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
230 Understanding, of course, that for a variety of reasons, licensing markets may be ineffi-
cient. See, e.g. , Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 257, 257 (2007). 
231 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-32 (1977); AREEDA & HovENKAMP, 
supra note 183, 'I 346c, at 165. 
232 See BORCHARD, supra note 26, at 741. 
233 See AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 346d, at 166 ("An equity suit neither 
threatens duplicative recoveries nor requires complex tracing through the distribution chain .. . . 
Illinois Brick has not therefore barred an indirect purchaser's suit for an injunction."). 
234 See Mc CARTHY, supra note 199, § 27:37. 
235 To the extent that the Federal Circuit appears concerned with (1) allowing patent hold-
ers to sit on their rights without having to worry about litigating to preserve the validity of their 
grants; or (2) vexatious or harassing litigation against patent holders, neither of those concerns 
justify narrow standing. As I describe in Part IV, infra, the former concern is not troubling as a 
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C. Summary: Who Has Standing to Challenge a Patent? 
These constitutional and prudential considerations suggest that 
standing to challenge the scope or validity of patents ought to be sig-
nificantly broader than the Federal Circuit currently allows. As de-
scribed above, the Federal Circuit's "proximity" test effectively 
precludes suit by any entities other than competitors.236 And even 
then, in order for a competitor to file suit, it has to be the target of 
some action by the patentee sufficient to put it on notice of a likely 
infringement suit.237 By contrast, a focus on the injury that arises from 
the existence of uncertain intellectual property yields a greater num-
ber of potential plaintiffs who may constitutionally bring suit, and pru-
dential concerns support granting standing to most of them. 
1. Competitors, Potential Competitors, and Similar Actors 
The injury described above is felt most directly by competitors in 
the field. They are the ones whose activities are most likely to be 
chilled by uncertain patents. Two important points distinguish com-
petitor standing under the theory developed in this Article from the 
Federal Circuit's current practice. First, the chilling effects of uncer-
tain patents are independent of any actions that the patent holder may 
take; that means that action by the patent holder is not required to 
establish standing. Second, the chilling effects of uncertain patents 
may be felt long before actual infringement becomes imminent. That 
is because "quiet title" actions are best brought before fixed invest-
ments can be subjected to the threat of holdup. Together these con-
siderations mean that not only competitors, but also potential and 
indirect competitors have standing. In addition, academic or other 
noncommercial actors might also be at risk and therefore entitled to 
file suit to clear the fields in which they are working of adverse 
patents. 
Take Myriad as an example. The only plaintiff with standing in 
that case was a doctor who (1) received a cease-and-desist letter from 
the patent holder, and (2) alleged that he would immediately begin 
using the claimed subject matter upon a judicial finding that the pat-
ent he challenged was invalid.238 That case would come out differently 
under the analysis that I propose. Physicians who might consider of-
normative matter, and the latter can be addressed through other less restrictive changes to the 
litigation ecosystem. 
236 See supra Part I. 
237 See supra Part I. 
238 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff d 
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fering their own genetic testing services for the genes that are linked 
with breast cancer face a risk of liability regardless of whether they 
have actually been contacted by Myriad Genetics or not. And they 
face a risk of liability not only if they would immediately be able to 
infringe, but also if they would need time to plan their businesses or 
facilities. 
To be sure, a plaintiff must still show that her injury is "concrete 
and particularized," that is, it "must affect the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way. "239 Plaintiffs must demonstrate facts that support 
their claim that a "quiet title" -like determination will actually remove 
the cloud of uncertainty from their plans. These facts are likely to be 
easier to demonstrate the closer a competitor is to launching an in-
fringing product or service. But early stage competitors are by no 
means excluded. Antitrust again provides a useful example. In that 
area of the law, nascent firms may bring suit claiming that they would 
have entered a market but for a defondant's anticompetitive conduct. 
In such cases, courts consider a variety of factors including "the finan-
cial ability to enter the market, the background and experience that 
makes success possible, and that [the firm] ha~ undertaken such signif-
icant steps toward entry as architectural plans or building commit-
ments, contracts with prospective customers, or substantial marketing 
expenditures."240 Similarly, in the patent context, courts deciding 
whether potential competitors legitimately have standing can consider 
the extent and detail of their business plans, their existing commit-
ments, and other such factors. The inquiry is not about the imminence 
of infringement, but about the likelihood that the plaintiff actually is 
chilled by uncertainty. 
Neith~r do competitors need to be threatened directly by patent 
holders. In a series of recent Federal Circuit cases, patent holders 
sued their competitors' customers for infringement arising out of their 
use of the competitors' products. When the competitors themselves 
sought declaratory judgments that their products were not infring-
ing-no doubt to protect their customers, at least in part-the Federal 
Circuit held that the competitors had standing only if they could rea-
sonably be accused of contributory infringement or inducement.241 
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013). 
239 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992). 
240 AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 183, 'l[ 349, at 227-28 (footnotes omitted) . 
241 See Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc. , 755 F.3d 899, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cisco Sys., 
Inc. v. Alta. Telecomms. Research Ctr. , 538 F. App'x 894, 897-98 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Arris Grp., 
Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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Under the analysis proposed here, such a showing would be unneces-
sary. Competitors' economic activity is chilled not only by direct 
threats, but also by indirect threats. No company would market a 
product if customers were under constant threat of infringement for 
using it. And the competitor is likely to be the more efficient litigator 
in these circumstances; suits against customers rather than the sup-
plier are likely patent holder gamesmanship. 
2. Consumers 
Consumers usually will not experience the type of injury that 
gives rise to standing under the analysis here. Consumers typically 
purchase a protected product from a manufacturer. If the manufac-
turer is making the product under license, then the only possible basis 
for the consumer's suit is that the consumer would pay less money for 
the product in the absence of a patent. But that is not the risk de-
scribed here. Nor is that alleged injury within the zone of interests 
described above. Complaints about price are the province of the anti-
trust rather than the patent laws. Indeed, the Federal Circuit recently 
drew a sharp distinction between the two. In Ritz Camera & Image, 
LLC v. SanDisk Corp. ,242 the court declined to apply its restrictive 
patent standing rules to the direct purchaser plaintiff's antitrust claim 
based on Walker Process fraud.243 That claim, that fraud on the PTO 
resulted in the improper issuance of a patent that was then used to 
anticompetitive effect, includes as one of its elements the need to 
show that the patent was invalid.244 The court wrote that "[a] Walker 
Process antitrust c;laim is a separate cause of action from a patent de-
claratory judgment action" and is therefore "governed by principles of 
antitrust law."245 
There may, however, be certain circumstances in which consumer 
suits are appropriate. First, some consumers might engage in user in-
novation. 246 These consumers not only purchase goods, but alter them 
and enga_~e in.. f~rther downstream innovation.247 Those activities may 
,. 
242 Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
243 Id. at 507-08 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. , 382 
U.S. J72 (1965)). 
244 Id. at 506. 
245 Id. at 508. 
246 See ERIC VON RIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 19-32 (2005); William w. Fisher 
III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1418-30 (2010) 
(describing a variety of user innovations); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implica-
tions for Patent Doctrine, 79 U . CoLo. L. REv. 467, 469 (2008) ("User innovators develop tech-
,nology for their own use, rather than to sell it."). 
247 See VON RIPPEL, supra note ,246. 
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be placed at risk because of uncertain intellectual property, and those 
who engage in them may therefore have standing to remove that un-
certainty. Second, if a consumer purchases a good that is infringing 
and not under license, the consumer can be liable for infringement. 
Most of the time, the patent holder will find it more economical to sue 
a manufacturer than a large number of dispersed users. But suits 
against consumers are not unheard of.248 Consumers facing such suits 
are facing regulation of their primary behavior. But so are the manu-
facturers, who, for the prudential reasons described above, are likely 
to be the preferred plaintiffs.249 When the preferred plaintiff does not 
have adequate incentive to sue, however, consumers may be granted 
standing instead.250 That may occur, for example, when a consumer 
can show that she has been threatened with litigation (a requirement 
that a competitor would not have to meet) or that the relevant com-
petitors for whatever reason have declined to sue. 
3. Interest Groups 
Finally, interest groups that raise purely ideological objections to 
particular patents are unlikely to have standing under the theory de-
scribed here. They are not themselves the subjects of regulation 
through patent enforcement and have no innovative activities to be 
chilled by patent uncertainty. 
Interest groups may, however, be able to sustain claims of associ-
ational standing. Under that doctrine, "an association has standing to 
bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would oth-
erwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks 
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither 
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation 
of individual members in the lawsuit."251 Interest groups that re-
present firms or individuals who may be subject to risk and uncer-
tainty from existing patents may therefore be able to sue as well. 
248 See generally, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. 
L. REv. 1443 (2014); Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000-For Using Scanners, ARs TECHNICA 
(Jan. 2, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-
using-scanners/; see also supra note 241. 
249 See supra Part III.B. 
2so Cf AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 183, 'I 348, at 202. In antitrust, where consum-
ers are the preferred plaintiffs, competitors may have standing where consumers do not have 
adequate incentives to sue. See id. 
2s1 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
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IV. BROADER PATENT STANDING Is CONSISTENT 
WITH SOUND POLICY 
The previous Parts described how patents may injure those work-
ing in fields they occupy, even in the absence of enforcement efforts 
by the patent holder, and argued that such injuries are sufficient for 
standing purposes under current doctrine. That analysis yields a 
broader concept of standing to challenge patent scope or validity than 
the courts of appeals currently contemplate. This Part defends that 
broader standing as a normative matter. 
A. The Need for Patent Challenges 
Patents are generated in vast quantities in the United States. The 
PTO now receives, for example, more than 560,000 utility patent ap-
plications every year and issues over 265,000 utility patents.252 At that 
volume, the PTO does not have the resources to examine every one of 
them accurately. It is estimated, for example, that each patent exam-
iner spends roughly eighteen hours examining each application.253 In 
these conditions, errors are inevitable. The PTO will necessarily issue 
patents that do not meet the standards for eligibility and that should 
not have been issued. Some empirical work in patents suggests that 
such errors are frequent-between 33% and 46% of patents litigated 
to judgment are found invalid.254 And even more commonly, the PTO 
will issue patents with uncertain boundaries.255 
Invalid patents are socially costly. They are patents that should 
not have been granted in the first instance. As such, their issuance is 
in derogation of the background principle that those works ineligible 
for protection under state or federal intellectual property laws are 
presumptively available to the public. As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, "[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent 
or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the 
free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested."256 
Invalid intellectual property imposes social costs both when it is 
enforced and when it is merely extant.257 The classic justification for 
252 See U .S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 189 tbl.2, 192 tbl.6. 
253 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A . LEMLEY, THE PATENT CR1s 1s AND Ho w THE CouRTS 
CAN SOLVE h 23 & 172 n.10 (2009). 
254 See supra note 72. 
255 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
256 Kellogg Co. v. Nat'! Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). 
257 See generally Lemley, supra note 146, 1058-59 (describing five types of social costs of 
intellectual property: static inefficiency, dynamic inefficiency, encouraging rent-seeking, adminis-
trative costs, and overinvestment in research and development). 
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intellectual property is that the costs of excluding others from practic-
ing the subject of the intellectual property are outweighed by the ben-
efits that come from encouraging innovation.258 If an invention is not 
eligible for patent protection, for example, it is thought that a patent is 
not necessary to provide incentives to produce the invention.259 That 
implies that invalid IP imposes all of the social costs of exclusive rights 
but confers none of the social benefits. And those social costs are 
significant-exclusive rights not only restrict access and create dead-
weight losses when consumer demand cannot be satisfied at marginal 
cost, but also impose significant restraints on further downstream 
innovation.260 
As described above, however, invalid patents need not be en-
forced to remain socially harmful. Their mere existence can serve as a 
powerful competitive deterrent, stifling the development of competi-
tive markets and distorting innovative resources to less socially pro-
ductive ends.261 The proliferation of patents in itself poses challenges. 
Multiple, potentially overlapping intellectual property rights give rise 
to the risk of "patent thickets" that companies must work through in 
order to commercialize products covered by multiple patents,262 and 
"anticommons" scenarios in which multiple dispersed rights must be 
aggregated in order to engage in innovative activity.263 
These costs are especially salient in light of the development of 
new business models based on the assertion of intellectual property. I 
refer here to the phenomena of patent "trolls." These are entities that 
use patents primarily to obtain licensing fees or litigation settlements 
rather than to support the development or transfer of technology.264 
258 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 215, at 1476-78, 1536-37. 
259 See, e.g. , Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentabil-
ity, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1594 (2011). 
260 The canonical statement of this problem can be found in Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention , in THE RATE AND D1REcrION OF INVEN-
TIVE ACTIVITY: EcoNOMIC AND SocIAL FACTORS 609, 619-20 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research 
ed. , 1962); see also Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 215, at 1499-1500. 
261 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
262 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stan-
dard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION Poucy AND THE EcoNOMY 119, 120-21 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001). 
263 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 698. To be sure, empirical evidence about the 
scale of the anticomrnons problem is mixed. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonen-
forcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 Hous. L. 
REv. 1059, 1061-62 (2008). I assume that this anticomrnons problem remains a threat that might 
be alleviated by reducing the number of existing invalid patents. 
264 There is no single definition of a "patent troll." I follow Colleen Chien's definition of 
"patent assertion entities." See Chien, supra note 2, at 300. 
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The patent troll business model takes advantage of the asymmetry of 
costs between plaintiffs and defendants to extract nuisance settle-
ments.265 Because these entities do not themselves practice any inven-
tions or use any creative works that may be subject to counterclaims, 
the cost of asserting their intellectual property is far lower than de-
fendants' costs of defense.266 Yet infringement judgments may subject 
defendants to devastating losses-injunctive relief and very high dam-
ages multiples. As a result, many defendants choose to settle.267 
Trolls increase the social cost associated with invalid intellectual prop-
erty. Because their business model depends less on success in court 
than on the extraction of nuisance settlements, and because they 
source most of their intellectual property from other parties that have 
no interest in or ability to commercialize it, their assertions may be of 
disproportionately invalid patents.268 
An exponential increase in the number of issued patents coupled 
with increasing concerns about the behavior and social costs of patent 
assertion entities has led to widespread calls to increase the "quality" 
of issued patents-that is, to reduce the number of invalid patents and 
their attendant social costs.269 There are, broadly speaking, two ways 
one can do this. The PTO can be more thorough in applying the crite-
ria for patent validity during its initial examination. Or the agency 
and courts can apply a light initial screen and then a deeper review in 
litigation after the patent issues. Mark Lemley has argued that it 
makes little sense to improve patent quality solely by increasing the 
265 See Colleen Chien, Presentation at FfC-DOJ Joint Public Workshop on Patent Asser-
tion Entity Activities: Patent Assertion Entities, 13-19 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http:// 
ssm.com/abstract=2187314. 
266 See id. at 19. 
267 See id. at 13-19. 
268 There are several sources of evidence to suggest that trolls press particularly weak IP 
claims. Allison, Lemley, and Walker find that non-practicing entities (NPEs) who file multiple 
lawsuits to enforce a single patent win only 9.2% of the cases that they litigate to judgment. See 
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Re-
peat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 691-95 & fig.4 & tbl.9 (2011). Nearly 70% of the most-
litigated patents in their study-most of which are held by NPEs-were found invalid. See id. at 
706. Risch reports similar results for the most-litigated patents, but is skeptical about the con-
nection between this finding and the asserting entity's status as a troll. See Michael Risch, Patent 
Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 457, 481-84 (2012). Finally, Chien reports based on survey 
data that some 40% of startup companies targeted by patent trolls "stated that they were being 
targeted because of their use of another's or a widely available technology." Colleen V. Chien, 
Stanups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 461, 464-65 (2014). 
269 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2135, 2136-37 & n.l (2009) (citing sources); id. at 2138-39 (defining patent quality as "the 
capacity of a granted patent to meet ( or exceed) the statutory standards of patentability"). 
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resources expended in patent examination.270 In brief, a large number 
of patents are applied for and issue, but very few are ever the subject 
of litigation or licensing.271 In Lemley's view, the cost of more de-
tailed examination to weed out bad patents is not justified because 
few of those patents ultimately will be of any importance.272 Instead, 
he argues that it is rational to apply a light screen at the examination 
stage and then allow interested parties to devote the more significant 
resources necessary for a detailed examination in litigation once it be-
comes clear which patents will be important and which will not.273 Al-
though this argument has its limits,274 its basic logic suggests at the 
very least that the problem of invalid patents cannot be solved by ad-
ministrative solutions alone, or even primarily. The costs of such a 
solution will inevitably exceed its benefits. 
The courts therefore have a critical role to play in screening out 
invalid patents. Indeed, the courts are the ultimate arbiters of patent 
validity (and scope).275 Recognizing this role, the Supreme Court has, 
on numerous occasions, "emphasized the importance to the public at 
large of resolving questions of patent validity."276 And it has "en-
courage[d] authoritative testing" of patent validity in court.277 Impor-
tantly, the courts enjoy primacy in determinations of patent validity 
notwithstanding Congress's enactment of procedures for administra-
tive post-grant review. Those procedures-found in the America In-
vents Act278-aim to provide a less costly way to challenge the validity 
270 See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 97, at 1497. 
271 Id. 
212 Id. 
273 See id. at 1508-11. 
274 Importantly, Lemley's argument is not an argument against any improvements to the 
screening process. And, indeed, a number of proposals for reform make sense even accounting 
for the "rational ignorance" that Lemley describes. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity , 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 50 (2007) (proposing 
heightened PTO review of certain patent applications). 
275 See supra note 71-72 and accompanying text. 
276 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993). 
277 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344 (1971). The Court 
has done so through a number of mechanisms. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118, 130-34 (2007) (licensee need not violate license to bring action for declaratory judg-
ment of invalidity); Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 100-01 (finding of noninfringement does not 
moot counterclaims for invalidity); Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 346-48 (patent holder estopped 
from re-litigating finding of invalidity); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-68 (1969) (licen-
sees not estopped from asserting invalidity of a patent as a defense in contract action for unpaid 
royalties). 
278 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012). 
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of patents.279 But because their results too can be appealed to the 
federal courts,280 it is those courts that retain the final word. 
B. The Misalignment Between Current Standing Rules and 
Incentives to Bring Patent Challenges 
Most basically, expanded standing along the lines I describe in 
Part III will promote more "authoritative testing" of patent scope and 
validity. It stands to reason that if it is easier for plaintiffs to bring 
invalidity cases, more such cases will be brought. Broader standing 
can also discourage certain bad behaviors that have become common 
among IP holders. One common tactic, for example, is for a patent 
holder to threaten potential infringers in a way that falls just short of 
the now malleable standard for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.281 
That way the patent owner can induce behavioral changes yet shield 
its patent from challenge.282 Similarly, some patent holders will file 
suit and then, when it appears that their patent is legitimately 
threatened, settle and make a unilateral covenant not to sue that may 
moot any declaratory judgment counterclaim.283 The risk-based 
standing analysis proposed above reduces the effectiveness of this 
gamesmanship.284 No particular behavioral trigger controlled by the 
patent holder is necessary for jurisdiction, and mooting a present in-
fringement controversy generally would have no effect on an infringe-
ment defendant's standing to eliminate the risk that such a dispute 
might arise again in the future.285 
This could also help alleviate the asymmetric structure of troll 
litigation that contributes to nuisance settlements.286 Broader stand-
ing would allow potential infringers to make credible threats of valid-
ity litigation even in the absence of direct threats from the troll. That 
279 See Mata!, supra note 11. 
280 See 35 U.S.C. § 319, 329 (2012). 
281 See, e.g., Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
282 See Leslie, supra note 84. 
283 See, e.g., Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 721 , 733-34 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Benitec Aust!. , Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., 
dissenting). 
284 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to 
Innovate After Medlmmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971 , 979-82 (2009). 
285 The courts in Already, 133 S. Ct. at 728-29, and Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. 
Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2013), interpreted covenants not to sue and 
statements clisclainiing intent to sue broadly enough to cover future conduct, thereby leaving 
open the question whether covenants that are linlited to past or present conduct-the vast ma-
jority of such covenants-moot invalidity claims. 
286 See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text. 
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in itself would serve as a check on troll behavior similar to the threat 
of counterclaim suits for practicing entities. It would also, as de-
scribed above, help to reduce trolls' ability to engage in strategic be-
haviors that allow them to simultaneously assert their patents and 
shield them from challenge.287 
There is, however, a deeper reason why broader standing is justi-
fied. The current standing rules result in an underproduction of inva-
lidity litigation. Even where sufficient incentives exist in plaintiffs that 
can qualify under the current rules, the standing rules may distort the 
types of patent challenges that the courts hear. This is because, as 
described above,288 the current standing regime largely limits standing 
to presently existing competitors. Those competitors are unlikely to 
bring the most socially valuable validity challenges. 
Several scholars have observed that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion,289 which gives findings of invalidity preclusive effect in subse-
quent litigation between different parties,290 makes invalidity litigation 
a "public good," subject to familiar problems of underproduction.291 
In the typical case, a single challenger bears fhe full cost of the invalid-
ity litigation. But the rule in Blonder-Tongue means that the chal-
lenger must share the fruits of her labors with the world. This creates 
several problems. The first is free riding. Because the costs of chal-
lenging patents are borne singly but the benefits are spread globally, 
parties who might be interested in such challenges have an incentive 
to free ride on the efforts of others.292 In other words, because patent 
287 See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that trolls engage in a 
variety of legal strategies, which may be affected to varying degree by the possibility of easier 
validity challenges. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the 
Trolls, 113 CoLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119-29 (2013) . 
288 See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
289 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
290 Id. at 333-34. 
291 See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why Litigation Won 't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 951-55 (2004); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to 
Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 787-97 (2002); Joseph Scott Miller, 
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 667, 685-88 (2004); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A 
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 333-34. 
292 See Miller, supra note 291 , at 687-88 ("Blonder-Tongue, considered alone, eliminates a 
patent attacker's ability to exclude others from appropriating the benefit of its successful patent 
attack. It thus turns patent invalidity judgments into public goods. And the resulting free rider 
problem, which discourages patent challenges, is at least as stark as the one that justifies provid-
ing a patent system in the first place."); Thomas, supra note 291 , at 334 ("[A]mong [Blonder-
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challenges generate positive spillovers, we can expect to see fewer of 
them than is optimal. 293 
But the dynamics of patent challenges are even more pernicious. 
The free rider problem described above is exacerbated by the fact that 
those who would benefit from patent challenges are often competitors 
of one another. A successful challenger therefore not only shares the 
benefits of his challenge with the world at large, but more particularly 
shares them with his competitors. This means not only that the collec-
tive action problem described above is that much harder to overcome, 
but also that challengers may have an incentive to engage in collusive 
settlement with patent holders.294 Beyond a simple desire not to bene-
fit competitors, it may be advantageous for one competitor armed 
with a strong invalidity argument to strike a deal with the patent 
holder. As Thomas writes, "[s]o long as sufficient supracompetitive 
profits exist to go around, the patentee ordinarily possesses incentives 
to suppress the prior art by means of a favorable license. Both parties 
may then extract information rents from the consuming public by 
maintaining artificially high prices due to an invalid patent. "295 Re-
verse payment settlements from branded drug manufacturers to ge-
neric drug manufacturers are a particularly salient example of this 
problem.296 In those cases, a generic manufacturer chooses to accept 
payment to stay off the market rather than proceed with its challenge 
to a patent covering a branded pharmaceutical product.297 This ar-
rangement may be in both parties' interests-the branded manufac-
turer protects its patent and the challenger receives a large sum to 
drop the challenge-but it is in derogation of the broader social inter-
est in eliminating the potentially invalid pharmaceutical patent. 
The existing literature suggests several ways to better align the 
incentive of potential patent challengers with the socially optimal 
Tongue's] drawbacks is that a potential opponent cannot appropriate the benefits of a successful 
charge of patent invalidity to itself. In economic terms, the benefits of a successful charge of 
patent invalidity become noiiexcludable."). 
293 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 CouJM. L. REv. 257, 
286-89 (2007) (describing spillovers problem in the context of copyright defenses); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 CoLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1487 
(2013). 
294 See Thomas, supra note 291, at 335-37. 
295 Id. at 335; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 701--02 (noting that, contra to the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Lear, licensees often have little incentive to challenge patents). 
296 See FfC v. Actavis, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for 
Delay: Pharmaceutical .Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1553, 1557-60 (2006). 
297 See Hemphill, supra note 21~, at 1553. 
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amount of challenges: bounties,298 fee shifting,299 and defensive cost-
sharing.300 But there is another solution: broader standing.301 The 
challenges of collective and collusive action described above are most 
severe with respect to competitors. Because the current standing rules 
largely permit suit only by that class of challengers, there is a mis-
match between the optimal incentives to challenge patents and the 
justiciability rules governing who can bring such suits. 
The standing principles described in Part III would authorize suit 
by a variety of persons who face different incentives to challenge pat-
ents but who are currently precluded from doing so. These persons 
include potential competitors, indirect competitors, and those who re-
spond to nonpecuniary incentives.302 Begin with potential competi-
tors. There are reasons to believe that potential competitors may be 
in a position to overcome the collective action problem described 
above. Their cost-benefit calculus tends to focus more on investments 
over time than on present competitive positioning. The relevant ques-
tion for a potential competitor is whether the costs of challenging a 
patent exceed the risk-adjusted costs of potential holdup by that pat-
ent after several years of costly investments. It may then be rational 
to bear the full cost of litigation if it either saves the compa~y from 
potential losses due to holdup or clears the way for investments over 
time. The fact that others may free ride upon such efforts does not 
enter that calculus. Free riding may be of less importance to potential 
competitors for another reason. These competitors usually play in 
nascent or underdeveloped markets where direct competition does 
not yet exist. While it is true that their efforts to challenge patents 
may benefit others who are developing the nascent market,303 that 
298 See Miller, supra note 291, at 704-11 ; Thomas, supra note 291 , at 340-42. 
299 See Kesan, supra note 291 , at 795-97. 
300 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 76, at 89-90. 
301 The analyses above were all made during the time when the "reasonable apprehen.sion 
of suit" test defined the limits of declaratory judgment jurisdiction and appear to assume this 
restrictive test for standing as the baseline for determining who can bring suit. See, e.g., Farrell & . 
Merges, supra note 291, at 946-47. Lemley & Shapiro do suggest "encourag[ing] public interest 
organizations to challenge suspect patents," supra note 76, at 90, but do not link the feasibility of 
this suggestion to standing rules. 
302 See supra Part 111.C. 
303 Abramowicz and Duffy have argued that there may be underproduction of new markets 
when competitors can appropriate the information generated by the first experimenter. See 
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 367-369 (2008). In previous work, I have disputed that intellectual property 
is necessary to solve that production problem. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information 
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 240 (2012). 
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benefit does not represent a direct and presently existing competitive 
threat in the absence of well-defined products and markets. 
Indirect competitors similarly may be less sensitive to free riding. 
These are entities that do not compete in the same market as the 
patentholder and therefore are unlikely themselves to be infringers.304 
Instead, they typically compete "upstream" as suppliers to direct in-
fringers. That business model usually involves either licensing tech-
nology or facilitating the use of patented technology by others.305 
Their revenues are dependent not upon their own exploitation of pat-
ented technology, but on the widespread exploitation of that technol-
ogy by others.306 They should therefore be relatively indifferent to-
and indeed, supportive of-widespread adoption of the patented tech-
nology should they be successful in their suit. Indeed, collusion with 
the patent holder to limit the spread of the technology is unlikely to 
be in their interest. 
Finally, there is a class of plaintiffs whose incentives to bring suit 
are not limited to pecuniary interests. Among this class are public 
interest groups like the Public Patent Foundation or the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and the test plaintiffs they recruit such as non-
profit or academic researchers or technologists. Academic research-
ers, for example, may be motivated by a desire to spread the benefits 
of scientific research more widely and this motivation may trump fi-
nancial motivations to exploit the technology for monetary gain.307 
Because these plaintiffs see it as part of their mission to encourage 
widespread dissemination of technology, they are willing to expend 
the funds and share the benefits broadly. Indeed, to these plaintiffs, 
free riding is a feature rather than a bug. 
Of course, patent challenges do happen even under existing rules, 
and potential challengers do have some incentive to bring suit, though 
perhaps with less frequency than optimal.308 But even where the in-
304 Cf Matthews Int'! Corp. v. Biosafe Eng'g, LLC, 695 F.3d 1322, 1328-31 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(holding that indirect competitor lacked standing). 
305 See id. at 1330. 
306 See id. 
307 See, e.g. , Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 88-94 (1999) (describing traditional norms of shar-
ing in scientific communities). This view is necessarily a simplification. See, e.g. , Peter Lee, 
Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 35-38 (2013). I do not mean to argue that all aca-
demics experience these incentives, but rather that enough do that a legal change granting 
broader standing would likely result in more challenges brought by those who have incentive to 
do so. 
308 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 76, at 89 (concluding that the incentive to challenge 
invalid IP depends on a myriad of fact-specific circumstances). 
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centive exists to challenge patents, there is a further under-explored 
problem. The precise nature of the challenge will of course depend on 
the challenger's interests. Competitors' interests may again diverge 
from the social optimum. There are a number of different ways to 
contest the validity of any given patent. Some are specific to the pat-
ent itself. A claim that the patent fails the requirements of novelty 
and nonobviousness usually has this structure. It is a claim based on 
specific facts about whether the subject matter claimed in the patent 
existed in the world prior to invention or application or whether the 
subject matter of the patent would have been obvious to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art. But other defenses operate more categor-
ically. A claim that a patent falls outside of eligible subject matter, for 
example, purports to exclude from patentability certain content alto-
gether. Take the example of human gene patents. A patent-specific 
claim of invalidity, say, that the patent is not novel, is a claim that 
someone else had previously discovered the particular gene.309 By 
contrast, an argument that the patent does not claim eligible subject 
matter is an argument that genes are not patentable.310 That latter 
argument affects far more than the single patent; it potentially has the 
effect of invalidating a large number of issued patents.311 
Now consider who has an incentive to bring a particular kind of 
challenge. Competitors are likely to bring only patent-specific chal-
lenges. Any challenge that sweeps more broadly likely impacts their 
intellectual property as well. So a competitor challenging a gene pat-
ent will argue that that patent is invalid, but not that genes as a cate-
gory are unpatentable. If he owns similar patents, then that latter 
argument will redound to his detriment.312 This phenomenon may ex-
plain why the question whether genes constitute patentable subject 
matter remained unresolved for almost thirty years after the PTO be-
gan issuing such patents.313 The current standing rules, by limiting 
standing for the most part to competitors, distort the development of 
309 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). I am over-simplifying here. The more specific argument 
is that the subject matter of the claim existed in the prior art at the date of application. 
310 See id. § 101; Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
311 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1347-48 (Moore, J ., concurring in part). 
312 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 293, at 1512-14 (noting that class and general 
defenses may suffer from underproduction relative to individualized defenses because they are 
accompanied by significant spillovers). 
313 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1343-44 (Moore, J. , concurring in part). 
The Supreme Court resolved the issue on appeal-it held that genes were not patentable. Myr-
iad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 at 2117. 
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the substantive law of patents. By limiting standing to a particular 
class of plaintiffs, they encourage challenges based on arguments that 
are in those plaintiffs' interests, rather than based on the full spectrum 
of validity issues that any given patent may present. 
Broader standing along the lines described in this article could 
help solve that more specific under-production problem. Just as those 
plaintiffs other than direct competitors may have more incentive to 
bring patent challenges in the first place, so too may they have incen-
tive to bring a-wider range of challenges. Potential and indirect com-
petitors often operate in markets adjacent to the intellectual property 
they are challenging. They are therefore less likely to shy away from 
broader challenges to that intellectual property. Similarly, those moti-
vated by nonpecuniary concerns are likely to be relatively uninhibited 
in the scope of challenges that they bring. 
C. Mitigating the Potential Costs of Expanded Standing 
Of course, broader standing is not costless. It encourages more 
litigation. The costs of that litigation will be borne primarily by patent 
holders who need to defend against cases that they otherwise could 
avoid. This section briefly explains why those increased costs likely do 
not outweigh the benefits described above. 
Broader standing increases the possibility that a patent holder 
may have to incur costs to defend her patent in an administrative ac-
tion or a lawsuit. One objection to broader standing, then, is that a 
patent holder should not have to bear such costs. There are two ways 
to conceptualize this objection. The first is to argue that once a patent 
has issued, a patent holder that chooses not to enforce it for whatever 
reason should not be compelled to defend it in court. This formula-
tion of the objection, however, assumes that unenforced intellectual 
property is harmless. As described above, that assumption is not justi-
fied. 314 It also reflects a view that patent holders should be left alone 
once \their IP has issued. But patents are only presumed to be valid 
when they 'issue. They are not actually valid until they are tested in 
court.315 And Congress, by providing for administrative review after 
grant, has· at least indicated that patent owners must be prepared to 
defend their exclusive rights upon application by a third party.316 
There is no reason why the expectation should be any different with 
314 See supra Part II. 
315 See supra note 4. 
316 See 35 U.S.C. §,§ 311(a)-(b), 321(a)-(b) (2012). 
2015] RETHINKING STANDING IN PATENT CHALLENGES 549 
respect to actions brought initially or subsequently to administrative 
review in the federal courts. 
A different formulation of the objection posits that patent appli-
cants will have to factor the possibility of incurring post-grant litiga-
tion costs into their decision whether to obtain the IP in the first 
instance. Broader standing in this view makes it more expensive on 
average to obtain a grant of exclusive rights.317 It is far from clear, 
however, that increasing the expense of intellectual property results in 
a social welfare loss. At the margin, it is likely to result in fewer is-
sued patents. But as David Fagundes and Jonathan Masur write, the 
costly nature of the patent acquisition process is a "classic costly 
screen."318 The cost of acquisition "forc[es] actors who seek to acquire 
legal rights to consider whether acquisition of the right will be worth 
the cost of doing so. "319 With respect to patents, there is reason to 
believe that the effect of the costly screen is to deter the production of 
low private value rights that also have low social value.320 The argu-
ment is that because the PTO employs only a rough screen, as de-
scribed above,321 it is highly likely that patents of low social value will 
issue-that is, patents whose mere existence imposes costs but whose 
issuance is unaccompanied by a significant social benefit because they 
are invalid. Imposing a cost deters applicants whose private valuation 
of the patent does not meet the cost threshold. It is then highly likely 
that patents of low private value also have low social value, so this 
cost is socially beneficial. 
It is of course difficult to determine the optimal cost of the 
screen, and therefore difficult to say with certainty that increasing the 
cost of obtaining a patent by making it more likely the holder will 
have to defend that patent in a su~sequent proceeding will confer a 
social benefit. But there is reason to believe it is so. Consider, for 
example, that the cost of patenting has remained roughly similar for 
the last several years even as the volume of patent applications has 
skyrocketed.322 Meanwhile, the problems associated with low social 
317 Justice Harlan, concurring in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & 
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), expressed concern that validity challenges might "chill" 
patenting activity. Id. at 180 (Harlan, J. , concurring). That case, however, involved the threat of 
treble damages in an antitrust suit. Suits or administrative actions seeking a declaration of inva-
lidity do not subject patent holders to such damages. 
318 David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REv. 
677, 680 (2012). 
319 Id. at 679-80. 
320 See id. at 696-700. 
321 See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. 
322 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 189 tbl.2 (total patent applica-
,'} , 
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value patents, like patent trolls in the software and telecom industries, 
have gained increasing public salience.323 This suggests that additional 
deterrence may be socially valuable. 
Aside from imposing costs on patent holders, which may do more 
good than harm, there is a different and more concerning problem 
that arises from the operation of Blonder-Tongue's preclusion rule. 
Recall that Blonder-Tongue gives judgments of invalidity preclusive 
effect in subsequent litigation between different parties.324 It does not 
extend that preclusion, however, to judgments of validity.325 This 
asymmetry means that a patent holder must defend against every 
claim of invalidity. If she loses only once, her patent is invalid. But 
challengers can bring actions repeatedly. This rule therefore presents 
a real threat of vexatious or harassing litigation. Broader standing 
may increase this risk to patent holders. 
There are several mechanisms, however, that can help to mitigate 
this risk. One is simply the cost of litigation. Patent challenges are 
expensive for both plaintiffs and defendant-s. Plaintiffs in such cases 
can obtain a declaration that the patent in question is invalid or not 
infringed, but cannot collect damages or attorneys' fees. The nuisance 
value of such suits is therefore limited.326 For the most part, we can 
expect such suits to be legitimate because plaintiffs will not be incen-
tivized to bring the suit for a reason other than actual invalidation of 
the intellectual property. 
But suppose that cost is no issue. Say that a large corporation 
decides to set up a $1 billion fund to attack any and all software pat-
ents that it can find. Again, as to meritorious suits, there are reasons 
to think that the cost to patent holders is justified, as described above. 
Repeated or harassing litigation enabled by this structure, however, 
represents a real danger. I offer both a set of modest solutions based 
tions filed more than doubled between 1999 and 2013); Fagundes & Masur, supra note 318, at 
689-90 & nn.38-39. 
323 See supra note 2. 
324 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found , 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971) . 
325 See 6A DONALD s. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 19.02[2][e] , at 19-112 (2013). The 
same is true of judgments of noninfringement in cases that pose different fact -specific questions 
among the various potential plaintiffs. 
326 One potential exception may be in the context of licensing negotiations, where a credi-
ble threat to initiate invalidity proceedings could give a potential licensee significant leverage. 
See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 284, at 984-91; SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 
F.3d 1372, 1383-85 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Bryson, J. , concurring in the result). One solution to this 
problem, which Dreyfuss & Pope advocate, is reconsideration of the doctrine of licensee estop-
pel. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 284, at 1006. This is a more tailored solution to a particu-
lar problem of incentives to innovate than is a blanket restriction on standing. 
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on the application of existing preclusion law and discretionary limits 
on jurisdiction and a more radical solution to redirect validity litiga-
tion away from patent holders and toward the government. 
Ordinary preclusion principles are likely to prevent repeated liti-
gation. Although Blonder-Tongue establishes an asymmetry between 
findings of validity and invalidity as a matter of issue preclusion, prin-
ciples of claim preclusion continue to bar subsequent suits by the same 
parties.327 A challenger who is unsuccessful in asserting a claim of in-
validity cannot simply assert the same claim against the same patent 
holder in a different forum, even if the precise grounds for challenge 
are different or there has been an intervening change of law in be-
tween the suits.328 It is also worth noting in this context that Congress 
has designed post-grant review proceedings with these principles in 
mind.329 
Claim preclusion does not, of course, bind different parties. A 
subsequent challenger can still bring a substantially identical suit, forc-
ing the patent holder to litigate multiple proceedings. A solution to 
this problem might be to soften or eliminate the asymmetry that 
Blonder-Tongue creates. Many courts have recognized the potential 
unfairness to patent holders that results from having to relitigate 
"wins" but not "losses" and therefore grant some weight to previous 
judgments of validity under principles of comity.330 The danger in ex-
tending full preclusive effect to judgments of validity is that it may not 
be the case that a single plaintiff has an interest in bringing every pos-
sible challenge to a particular patent.331 So a finding in one litigation 
that a patent is valid likely should not bar subsequent challenges on 
different grounds by different parties who could not litigate their 
claims in the first action. A useful middle ground would be to grant 
issue preclusive effect in subsequent cases that raise the same grounds 
for or turn on the same evidence of invalidity as a previous case. 
327 See Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
("[C]laim preclusion applies where: ' (l) the same parties, or their privies, were involved in the 
prior litigation, (2) the prior litigation involved the same claim or cause of action as the later suit, 
and (3) the prior litigation was terminated by a final judgment on the merits." (quoting Cent. 
Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
328 See id. at 1380-81 (holding that subsequent counterclaim of invalidity was barred by 
claim preclusion where parties litigated previous claim arising out of same operative facts) . 
329 Under the new procedures in the America Invents Act, for example, a petitioner before 
the agency may not bring a subsequent petition for review "on any ground that the petitioner 
raised or reasonably could have raised during that post-grant review." 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(l) 
(2012). That principle applies as well to subsequent actions brought in court. See id. § 325(e)(2). 
330 See 6A Ctt1suM, supra note 325, § 19.02[2][e], at 19-112-19 (collecting cases). 
331 See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
552 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:498 
The courts also have a variety of discretionary mechanisms that 
they can use to screen out cases that appear to be particularly vexa-
tious. The ripeness doctrine, for example, provides courts with a 
means to delay adjudication until particular issues become more fo-
cused between the parties, and could be used in this context to screen 
out particularly attenuated claims of injury that nonetheless meet the 
Article III and prudential standing bars described above. The federal 
courts also have broad discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
to decline to hear a suit seeking declaratory relief.332 These prudential 
or discretionary mechanisms are flexible. They operate for the most 
part on a case-by-case basis. They allow courts, therefore, selectively 
to deny access to the court for a variety of reasons without erecting a 
firm doctrinal barrier. Judicious application of these doctrines can 
likely prevent abuses by validity challengers while at the same time 
allowing for the benefits of broad standing described above. 
A more radical solution to the problem of vexatious litigation 
against patent holders would be to redirect validity litigation away 
from private parties and toward the government. In a sense the ex-
isting administrative review procedures are an attempt to encourage 
this. In those procedures, the PTO is the defendant and incurs the 
litigation cost. The AIA procedures even go so far as to preclude a 
petitioner electing administrative review from bringing the same 
claims against a private party in court.333 But the Federal Circuit has 
been reluctant to apply ordinary principles of administrative review to 
patent challenges.334 It may be time to reconsider that position. To 
the extent that a patent challenge is fundamentally an argument that 
the PTO acted wrongly when it issued the patent, the agency is the 
more natural defendant. The PTO can defend its ruling according to 
ordinary principles of administrative review; the patent holder can in-
tervene if necessary to develop additional facts. Symmetry between 
infringement litigation and challenger-initiated validity litigation 
could be achieved through mandatory joinder of the PTO or the use 
of something akin to a primary jurisdiction referral to give the PTO 
332 See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) ("The Declaratory 
Judgment Act provides that a court 'may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party,' not that it must do so." (citation omitted) .(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a))). 
333 See 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2) (providing for automatic stay of subsequently-filed civil ac-
tion); id. § 325(e)(2) (precluding subsequent civil suits for same claim of invalidity). 
334 See, e.g., Pregis Corp. v. Kappos, 700 F.3d 1348, 1357-61 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that 
review of PTO validity determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act is precluded by 
the Patent Act). 
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the first opportunity to defend its action.335 Putting the burden of va-
lidity defense on the agency that issues the intellectual property also 
can help solve a particular asymmetry in the law that encourages pat-
ent grants rather than denials. Because the PTO currently receives 
greater scrutiny for its denials than its grants, it is incentivized to grant 
more and to take an expansive view of the law.336 Requiring adminis-
trative defense of patent validity may simultaneously relieve this prob-
lem and reduce the burden on patent holders described above. 
CONCLUSION 
"Patent standing" is just standing. There is no justification for 
treating patent standing differently from any other justicj_ability prob-
lem. And the application of traditional standing principles to patent 
challenges yields a broader concept of standing than the courts ad-
dressing . the issue currently contemplate. The injury in such cases is 
the risk and uncertainty that patents create for others working in the 
same field. When those other market participants are deterred from 
engaging in innovative activity-when they rationally choose to 
forego making costly investments before resolving the uncertainty-
they have standing to bring what amounts to a quiet title action. They 
can clear the field of the adverse patent before making those invest-
ments. And this result is consistent with sound policy-it supports the 
innovation-promoting goals of the patent laws while avoiding the ills 
that standing doctrine is supposed to prevent. Broader standing 
should help to rein in some of the abuses of the patent system that 
have become increasingly prevalent in recent years. It will contribute 
to more meaningful public participation in developing patent policy. 
And it will help to ensure that patents serve not just private interests 
but those of the public more broadly. 
335 . See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administra-
tive Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 109, 136-48 (2000) (arguing for use of primary juris-
diction referrals from courts to the agency in patent cases). 
336 See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 503 (2011); Melissa F. Wasser-
man, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 379, 401 (2011). 
